15th Annual Conference for the International Society for Neoplatonic Studies (ISNS)
June 14–17, 2017
Olomouc, Czech Republic

Department of Philosophy,
Faculty of Arts, Palacký University Olomouc
Krizkovskeho 12, Olomouc

The conference coorganized by the Centre for Renaissance Texts within the project funded by the Czech Science Foundation as the project GA CR 14-37038G “Between Renaissance and Baroque: Philosophy and Knowledge in the Czech Lands within the Wider European Context”.
### Schedule

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<td>9:00–11:00</td>
<td>Form and Participation in Graeco-Arabic Neoplatonism → 2.18</td>
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<td>Divine Power and Presence in Later Platonism: Theurgy, Ritual, Epistemology, Aesthetics, and Metaphysics → 2.18</td>
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| THU | JUNE 15 | 9:00–11:00 | Early Modern Platonism → 2.18 | Time and Space in Neoplatonism → 2.03 | Souls, Soteriology, and Eschatology in Platonism → 2.05 |
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|     |         | 11:30–13:00 | Nature and Substance in the Late Antiquity → 2.18 | Metaphysics and Aesthetics in Neoplatonism → 2.03 | Souls, Soteriology, and Eschatology in Platonism → 2.05 |
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| FRI | JUNE 16 | 9:00–11:00 | Neoplatonism in Central Europe between the 15th and 17th Century → 2.18 | Time and Space in Neoplatonism → 2.03 | Neoplatonism in the Islamic World: Jewish, Christian and Muslim → 2.05 |
|     |         | ½ hour | BREAK |
|     |         | 11:30–13:00 | Neoplatonism in Central Europe between the 15th and 17th Century → 2.18 | Self-Constitution and Self-Knowledge in the Neoplatonic Tradition → 2.03 | Plato and Plotinus → 2.05 |
|     |         | ½ hour | LUNCH |
|     |         | 14:30–16:00 | Nature and Substance in the Late Antiquity → 2.18 | Time and Space in Neoplatonism → 2.03 | Souls, Soteriology, and Eschatology in Platonism → 2.05 |
|     |         | ½ hour | BREAK |
|     |         | 16:30–18:00 | Platonisms of the Imperial Age: Hermetism, Gnosticism, and the Chaldaean Oracles → 2.18 | Women and the Female in Neoplatonism → 2.03 | Metaphysics, Science, Religion → 2.05 |
|     |         | 19:00 | CONFERENCE DINNER |

| SAT | JUNE 17 | 9:00–17:30 | EXCURSION TO KROMERIZ (UNESCO): Archbishop’s chateau, Chateau Gallery, Archbishop’s Wine Cellars with wine degustation, Flower Garden |
Form and Participation in Graeco-Arabic Neoplatonism

Organizers: Jonathan Greig and Bethany Somma

Bethany Somma: Forms and [Natural] Participation in the Arabic Plotinus: A Reappraisal

Hanif Amin Beidokhti: A Neoplatonic Criticism of Aristotelian Categories: Plotinian Thought in Suhrawardī’s Criticism of Substance and Accidents

Jonathan Greig: Participated and Unparticipated Causes in Plotinus and Proclus

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**Warring Philosophies behind**  
**Christological Controversies**  
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Organizers  
Marcin Podbielski and Anna Zhyrkova

Anna Zhyrkova:  
The Ontological Paradox of Christ

Marcin Podbielski:  
Evagrius of Pontus' Christology, the Gnostic Principle of Mathetic Identity, and Its Possible Platonic Origins

Sergey Trostyanskiy:  
Cyril of Alexandria’s Theory of the Incarnate Union Re-examined

Dmitry Biriukov:  
Paradigms of Physics and Natural Philosophy in the Christological Controversies in Byzantium

Panel  
**Plato and Plotinus**  
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Gabriela Kurylewicz:  
Time in Music—for Plato and Plotinus

Mark J. Lovas:  
Plato and Emotion: Revelation, Frustration, Judgment

Leo Catana:  
Plato on Ethical Requirements and Options in the Process of Political Recognition: Gorgias 513a7–513c2

Gary Gurtler:  
Plotinus on Light and Vision

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Room 2.05
Panel

Divine Power and Presence in Later Platonism: Theurgy, Ritual, Epistemology, Aesthetics, and Metaphysics

Organizers Crystal Addey and Robert Berchman

- Thomas Vidart: The Identification with the Intelligible according to Plotinus
- Bruce J. Maclennan: Psychological Effects of Henosis
- Panagiotis Pavlos: Dionysius the Areopagite: A Christian Theurgist?

Panel

Metaphysics and Aesthetics in Neoplatonism

Organizers Oscar Federico Bauchwitz, Alessandra Beccarisi and Edrisi Fernandes

- Edrisi Fernandes: The Fusion of Platonic, Alchemical, and Shamanic Views in the Literature of Robert Marteau
- Alessandra Beccarisi: Ulrich of Strasbourg on Beauty
- Ota Gál: Beauty of Intellect and the Notion of Number in Plotinus

Křížkovského 12
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Myth, Mystery, and Exegetical Practice in the Neoplatonic Tradition

Organizer: José M. Zamora Calvo

Antoni Ładziński: The Meaning of Symbol and Allegory in Porphyry of Tyre’s “De Antro Nympha...”

Tamar Khubulava: Die Chaldäischen Orakel und Proklos

José María Zamora Calvo: Reading the Statesman Myth from the Proclean Approach

Panel

Divine Power and Presence in Later Platonism: Theurgy, Ritual, Epistemology, Aesthetics, and Metaphysics

Organizers: Crystal Addey and Robert Berchman

Crystal Addey: Divine Power, Immanence and Transcendence in Plotinus, Porphyry and Iamblichus

Robert M. Berchman: Origen of Alexandria. Exegesis, Contemplative Prayer, and the Limits of Language

Gary Gabor: Boethius and Later Greek Neoplatonism on Forms, God, and the Consolations of Contemplation and Philosophy

Jenny Messenger: Crests of a Range that was Obscured: Suzanne Lilar on Divine Echoes in Poetry and Myth

Křížkovského 14 Room 2.05

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Platonism in Late Byzantium
Jozef Matula

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Georgios Arabatzis:
Middle Platonism and Academic Skepticism in Late Byzantium

Jozef Matula:
Theodoros Metochites’ Reading of Plato

Florin Leonte:
Plato, Rhetoric, and Political Renewal in Late Byzantium

Georgios Steiris:
A Dispute among 15th Century Byzantine Scholars over Universals and Particulars

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Early Modern Platonism
Anna Corrias, Douglas Hedley and Valery Rees

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Anna Corrias:
Immortality of the Soul and Plato’s “Phaedo” in Marsilio Ficino’s Philosophy

Hanna Gentili:
Platonism and Religious Debates in Early Modern Italy. A Comparison between Marsilio Ficino (1433–1499) and Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola (1469–1533) on the Nature of Love and Prophecy

Angie Hobbs:
The Erotic Magus: Daimons and Magic in Ficino’s “de Amore”

Křížkovského 12
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<td>David Leech: Cudworth on “Superintellectual Instinct” as a Species of “Orphic-Pythagorean” Love</td>
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<td>Jacques Joseph: World Soul and the “Spirit of Nature”</td>
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<td>Rachel MacKinnon: How Do Bodies Become Extended? An Investigation into Plotinus’ Sensible Realm</td>
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<td>Dylan M. Burns: Does the Great Invisible Spirit Care? Foreknowledge and Providence in the Platonizing Sethian Treatises of Nag Hammadi</td>
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**Souls, Soteriology, and Eschatology in Platonism**
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- Svetlana Mesyats: Unknown Doctrine of Proclus or What Kind of Souls Did Proclus Discover?
- Harold Tarrant: Proclus on the Soul’s Difficulties when First in the Body
- Ilaria Ramelli: Psychology and Soteriology in Origen and Porphyry
- Laura Follesa: Herder’s “Thinking in Images” in Children and the Platonic Reminiscence

Panel
**Nature and Substance in the Late Antiquity**
Organizers: Karolina Kochanczyk-Boninska, Marta Przyszychowska and Tomasz Stepień

- Tomasz Stepień: Eunomius and Gregory of Nyssa on the Activity of God and Plotinus’ Theory of Double Activity
- Marta Przyszychowska: Time of Creation of Human Nature according to Gregory of Nyssa
- Karolina Kochanczyk-Boninska: Basil the Great’s Understanding of Substance in his Teaching about God’s Incomprehensibility
Panel | Metaphysics and Aesthetics in Neoplatonism
Organizers | Oscar Federico Bauchwitz, Alessandra Beccarisi and Edrisi Fernandes

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A vida criativa em Mestre Eckhart

Mikhail Khorkov: 
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Oscar Federico Bauchwitz: 
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Panel | Souls, Soteriology, and Eschatology in Platonism
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The Doctrine of Divine Ideas of Wyclif and Stanislaus of Znojmo

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Krzysztof Łapiński:
Philosophical Education of Women in Musonius Rufus’ Diatribes and Porphyry’s “Letter to Marcella”

Jana Schultz:
Maternal Causes in Proclus Metaphysics
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Self-Constitution and Self-Knowledge in the Neoplatonic Tradition
Organizer Marilena Vlad

Andrei Timotin:

Daniela Elena Tarbă:
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Gheorghe Pașcalău:
Time as a Self-Constituted Intellect in the Philosophy of Proclus

Thursday, June 15 16:30–18:00

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Philology and Exegesis in the Platonist Tradition
Organizer J.M. Johns

Jeff Johns:
衹 (εἰ, ᾗ) γέγονεν ἢ (εἰ, ᾗ) καὶ ἀειγενές ἐστιν

Michèle Anik Stanbury:
Alexander of Aphrodisias and Aristotle’s “Metaphysics” in Plotinus’ “Ennead” V, 9

Matteo Milesi:
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### Ancient Theology and the Cambridge Platonists

**Organizers:** Douglas Hedley and Natalia Strok

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Martin Žemla: Influentia, lumine et motu Solis irradiatus… Ficino’s Metaphysics of Light in the Work of Heinrich Khunrath

Jiří Michalík: Johannes Kepler and His Neoplatonic Sources

Tomáš Nejeschleba: The Platonic Framework of Valeriano Magni’s Philosophy

Luka Boršić and Ivana Skuhala Karasman: Adventures of a Christian Cabalist

Panel Time and Space in Neoplatonism
Organizers José C. Baracat Jr. and Suzanne Stern-Gillet

Irini F. Viltanioti: Time and Eternity in Porphyry’s Tyre

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Marc-Antoine Gavray: Philoponus and Simplicius on the Eternity of Time

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Panel
Neoplatonism in the Islamic World: Jewish, Christian and Muslim
Organizer Daniel Regnier

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A New addition to the Late Antique Neoplatonist Corpus? The Arabic Commentary on the Pythagorean Golden Verses Attributed to Proclus

Daniel Regnier:
Argument and Ascent in Islamic Neoplatonism: The Theology of Aristotle as Spiritual Exercise

Michael Engel:
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Yehuda Halper:
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Neoplatonism in Central Europe between the 15th and 17th Century
Organizer Tomáš Nejeschleba

Simon J.G. Burton:
Cusanus and the Universal Reformation: The Legacy of Fifteenth-Century Lullist and Neo-Platonic Reform

Petr Pavlas:
Triadism and the Book Metaphor in John Amos Comenius

Jan Čížek:
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Panel: Self-Constitution and Self-Knowledge in the Neoplatonic Tradition
Organizer: Marilena Vlad

Marilena Vlad:
The Self-Constituted Being. Proclus and Damascius

Chiara Militello:
Is Self-Knowledge One or Multiple? Consciousness in “Simplicius”, Commentary on On the Soul

François Lortie:
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Panel: Plato and Plotinus

Menahem Luz:
The Image of Socrates in Antisthenes’ Lost Dialogues

Miriam Byrd:
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Sara Ahbel-Rappe:
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Organizers: Karolina Kochanczyk-Boninska, Marta Przyszychowska and Tomasz Stepień

- Aron Reppmann: *Nonsubstantial Creaturely Being in Gregory of Nyssa’s “On the Soul and the Resurrection”*
- Valéry V. Petroff: *Aristotle’s Approach to the Problem of Corporeal Identity and its Development in the Later Tradition*
- Nadezhda Volkova: *Plotinus and Aristotle on Matter and Evil*

Panel: *Time and Space in Neoplatonism*  
Organizers: José C. Baracat Jr. and Suzanne Stern-Gillet

- Ashton Green: *Dimensionality and Tenuous Bodies: Discovering the Nature of Space in Neoplatonic Thought through Accounts of Light Transmission*
- Jeremy Byrd: *Standing in the Vestibule: Proclus on Intermediates*
- Michael Chase: *Damascius and al-Nazzām on the Atomic Leap*
Panel: Souls, Soteriology, and Eschatology in Platonism
Organizers: John F. Finamore and Ilaria Ramelli

Ágoston Guba: Desire and Dispositional Memory in Plotinus
Filip Karfić: The Soul-Body Relation Upside Down (Plotinus VI.4–5)
Lela Alexidze: Eros as Soul’s “Eye” in Plotinus: What Does It See and not See?

Panel: Platonisms of the Imperial Age: Hermetism, Gnosticism, and the Chaldaean Oracles
Organizers: Dylan M. Burns and Luciana Gabriela Soares Santoprete

Jonathan H. Young: Demons on the Border: The Overlapping Demonologies of Origen and Celsus
Luciana Gabriela Soares Santoprete: Des trois rois de Platon aux trois dieux d’Hésiode: la polémique antignostique dans le Traité 32, 3 de Plotin
Christopher Sauder: Providence and Gnosticism from Ennead 33 (II.9) to Enneads 47–48 (III.2–3)
Panel: Women and the Female in Neoplatonism
Organizer: Jana Schultz

Anna Afonasina: The Letters of the Pythagorean Women in Context
Sandra Dučić Collette: Duke William IX of Aquitaine, Countess of Dia… and the Reversal of the Platonic Concept of Love
Ludovica Radif: Donne “Fuori Misura” Alessandra Scala e Cassandra Fedele

Panel: Metaphysics, Science, Religion

Liliana Carolina Sánchez Castro: The Soul Harmony Theory: Testimony of an Hermeneutic Device for Reading Presocratic Theories in Late Antiquity
Monika Recinová: Reception of Xenophanes’ Philosophical Theology in Plato and Christian Platonists
Tomasz Mróz: Lewis Campbell’s Studies on Plato and their Philosophical Significance
It is no surprise that Plotinus’s account of forms and participation underwent much change in the course of the adaptation of the *Enneads* into Arabic. It has been argued (by Zimmermann 1986 and Adamson 2001) that the Adaptor of the Arabic Plotinus materials was influenced by the Arabic translation of Aristotle’s *De Anima*, an influence especially noticeable in his discussion of form and the so-called lower soul. In particular, it would appear as though the adaptation incorporates an Aristotelian psychological structure. The result is that the lower, brute soul is presented as the form of the body, and is in turn mortal, while the higher, rational soul continues in immortality and remains untouched by bodily affectivity.

In this paper, I examine the formal distinctions offered by the Arabic Plotinus in an effort to show in what way Plotinus’s formal network changes in the course of the Arabic adaptation. Specifically, I aim to determine (1) how many levels of form and formal participation the Adaptor carries over from the Plotinian
In the explanation of form and participation within the Arabic Plotinus materials, much rests on the role of Nature. Although Plotinus’s own treatment of nature is irregular, the account of Nature in the Arabic Plotinus materials is consistent and clear. I explicate the account in three moves. First, Nature is an innate, corporeal cause of bodies, and as such also functions to account for the participation of individuals in any given form. Second, the Adaptor utilizes the standard Neoplatonic emanation image of fire and heat to explain Nature’s relation to soul and forms, and relies on a strict hierarchical account in his exposition of participation. Third, the adaptation clearly argues that Nature is not only distinct from soul, but is actually a fourth hypostasis, lower than and ontologically separate from Soul. It is by way of Nature that bodily forms participate in formal reality. As a result, we find the notion of “brute soul” found in the adaptation is simply identical to Nature, and thus is not an Aristotelian account of soul, but faithfully Neoplatonic. In his reappraisal, the adaptor of Plotinus’s Enneads both systematizes and clarifies the complicated account of nature Plotinus offers.

Hanif Amin Beidokhti:
A Neoplatonic Criticism of Aristotelian Categories: Plotinian Thought in Suhrawardī’s Criticism of Substance and Accidents
LMU Munich (Munich School of Ancient Philosophy) (Germany)

Aristotle’s Categories, as one of the earliest philosophical writings translated into Syriac and Arabic, was traditionally, along with Porphyry’s Isagoge, considered as the introduction to Aristotle’s philosophy, with significant implications for all fields of philosophy including logic, physics and metaphysics. According to the bibliographic testimonies, Arabic translations of the Greek commentaries written by Porphyry, Stephen of Alexandria, Philoponus, Ammonius, Themistius, Theophrastus and Simplicius were also accessible, which invoked a serious body of scholarship around the Categories. Many philosophers in the Islamic world commented on it and defended its central doctrines, whereas some philosophers criticized its basic ideas. One of the most prominent critics of the Categories was the Neoplatonic philosopher Šihāb al-Dīn Yaḥyā Suhrawardī (d. 1191) who inherited not only the wealthy tradition of commentaries on Categories, but also the works of Avicenna (d. 1037) and later thinkers such as ‘Umar ibn Sahālān Sāwī (d. 1058) and Abū l-Barakāt Baġdādī (d. 1152), who both were likewise critics of Aristotelian philosophy. Discussing and analyzing categories was, thus, a recurrent motif in all of Suhrawardī’s so-called “didactic, Peripatetic” works.

Suhrawardī’s discussion on the categories covers almost all aspects of Peripatetic doctrine including the deduction method for attaining the final list of the categories as well as the catalog of the categories and their characteristics. In this presentation, I shall discuss Suhrawardī’s critical point of view against the Aristotelian list of the categories. For this purpose, I shall introduce Suhrawardī’s own reductionist division, as well as his main critiques which results in a fivefold list exactly similar to Plotinus’ list of the categories in Ennead VI. Suhrawardī’s criticism of Aristotelian theory of substance and accidents results in a rejection of hylomorphism and denial of substantiability of forms. This critique may betray a set of evidences for a case of Plotinus’ Ennead VI.1–3 reception in the 12th century philosophy in the Islamic world, and thereby further evidences for a fuller translation of Plotinus’ Enneads in Arabic.
Jonathan Greig:  
Participated and Unparticipated Causes in Plotinus and Proclus  
LMU Munich (Munich School of Ancient Philosophy)  
(Germany)

As those like E.R. Dodds have noted, Proclus makes a sharp break from Plotinus and the prior Platonic tradition by articulating the notion of unparticipated Forms or causes (ἀµέθεκτον), first introduced by Iamblichus and developed in Syrianus. However what has not been noted in the secondary literature is how much Proclus’ understanding of the ἀµέθεκτον, at least in the Elements’ Prop. 23, is in large part formulated from Plotinus’ description of the Forms in relation to their participants, as seen in Ennead VI.4–5: the Forms are “present” to all their participants and not limited to one or another participant. In Proclus, this becomes one central reason to make the Form unparticipated, and thus for Proclus to posit intermediary, particular forms; whereas in Plotinus this actually becomes the reason to hold the very opposite: that the Form must be directly participated.

The two stances result, at least in large part, from the differing views of what the participants participate: either (1) a particular form or entity, belonging only to that specific participant; or (2) the universal form or entity, belonging both to that participant and all the other participants. Whereas Proclus subscribes to (1), Plotinus argues for (2), since for him the contrary would eventually repeat the aporetic difficulty from Plato’s Parmenides of the whole/part relation of Forms to participants. Plotinus’ subscription to (2), however, suggests that the reality of particular properties, as forms-in-matter, is ultimately illusory, and does not play a distinct, ontological role between the transcendent Form and the participants. Proclus, on the other hand, argues for (1) by strongly emphasizing the distinct, ontological role of the imminent form, or proximate entity, for each entity: e.g., the participated form, “man”, that only belongs to Socrates, in contrast to the participated form, “man”, for Plato; likewise, the soul that belongs to Socrates as ontologically distinct from that of Plato (Parm. Comm. 707).

Thus, this paper seeks to prove that the major change in participated causal models between Plotinus and Proclus is not so much the introduction of a new concept, ἀµέθεκτον, for the Forms, but rather the assertion of particular, intermediary forms or principles that play a second explanatory role in addition to the universal Form. It is this move that results in Proclus adding the new concept of the “unparticipated” (ἀµέθεκτον) in relation to the participants. This paper will analyze, in brief detail, the reasons for Plotinus’ and Proclus’ reasons against and for this model, respectively. The significance of this change in causal frameworks can be seen in both figures’ understanding of, e.g., the identity of the intelligible in Intellect, up to the causal model for the One.
Marcin Podbielski and Anna Zhyrkova (organizers)

**WARRING PHILOSOPHIES BEHIND CHRISTOLOGICAL CONTROVERSIES**

Anna Zhyrkova:
*The Ontological Paradox of Christ*
University of Ignatianum, Krakow (Poland)

The proposed paper will depart from an analysis of ontological coherence of the orthodox Christian doctrine that asserts that two essentially and dramatically different beings were unified in the particular entity of Christ. This analysis will be performed from the points of view of ontologies professed by the philosophical schools known to early Patristic authors, namely from the standpoints of Platonism, Aristotelianism, Stoicism, and Neoplatonism. My discussions will be informed by the question whether those schools could provide Christian thinkers with conceptual tools adequate for elucidating the ontological paradox which had to be recognized in Christ. As I will turn my attention to the issue of which of those tools were actually employed by Christian thinkers of second and third centuries AD, both orthodox and unorthodox, another question will arise, one of whether any of those thinkers succeeded in maintaining orthodoxy alongside philosophical coherence.

Marcin Podbielski:
*Evagrius of Pontus’ Christology, the Gnostic Principle of Mathetic Identity, and Its Possible Platonic Origins*
University of Ignatianum, Krakow (Poland)

Recent discussions on Evagrius of Pontus have been focused on the question whether his doctrine is identical with the so-called Origenism that was condemned at the Second Council of Constantinople or whether it is rather a reinterpretation of original teaching of Origen. Much less focus is given to Medio- and Neo- platonic influences on Evagrius and on analogies between his manner of thinking and philosophical principles implied in some Gnostic texts. In my paper, I will propose an analysis of Evagrius’ claims that have a metaphysical bearing, which will not only turn attention to especially Medioplatonic echoes in Evagrian framework of reality, but also to a specifically Gnostic principle on which the consistency of his views seems to rely. Reliance on this principle, that might be called “a principle of mathetic identity”, and which appears to be implied in and allow for the Evagrian account of the union of God the Logos with the incorporeal named Christ, make one ask the question whether the label of Origenist is fully applicable to Evagrius and to what extent he is a Platonic, representing a branch of Platonic thought parallel to Neoplatonism.

Sergey Trostyanskiy:
*Cyril of Alexandria’s Theory of the Incarnate Union Re-examined*
Union Theological Seminary (New York)

The language of mixture was a commonsense phenomenon in late antiquity. Not unexpectedly, it was extensively utilized during the time of great Christological debates of the 4th–6th centuries. It can be found in various treatises of Gregory of Nazianzus, Apollinaris, and others. Moreover, the notion of mixture became...
a key theological concept in the discourse of various miaphysite thinkers. Cyril of Alexandria, a great mind of Christendom, was charged during the Nestorian crisis with teaching the mixture of natures. Was this change legitimate? At first, he seemed to deny the mixture of natures as a valid conception of the Incarnate Union. However, some ancient and modern historians also suggested that he perhaps used the language of mixture (in whatever conceptual form it may have appeared) as a simile of the Incarnation. Consequently, they questioned whether Cyril thought of that which happens at the event of the Incarnation as maintaining a similar ratio or structure of elements to that of mixture. They assumed that Cyril had a wide spectrum of choices for mixture in front of his eyes, raging from Aristotelian to Neo-Platonic theories. As far as the deeper metaphysics of the Incarnation is concerned, in this presentation I aim to elucidate the extent of usefulness of the notion of mixture in constructing Christological arguments characterized by the imposition of the idea of isomorphism between the mixture of elements and the Incarnation. I also attempt to investigate whether it is possible to think of mixture as a passing rhetorical trope present in Cyril’s discourse. I argue that the theory of mixture introduced by Neo-Platonic thinkers offered one significant advantage to theologians since their conception, in fact, it did not require the imposition of a definitive tertium quid, just an opposite to that of unification through mutual alteration of properties, as the product of mixture of the ingredients. Hence, such unification was thought to allow the active ingredient to remain “one and the same” “before” and “after” the unification, a whole made out of parts, whereas the position of parts seem to make a difference for the being of the whole. In this context I argued that we may hypothesize that the Neo-Platonic conception of mixture could have been used by Cyril as a useful simile or analogy of the Incarnation as far as it was capable of expressing the notion of unification.
PLATO AND
PLOTINUS

Gabriela Kurylewicz:
Time in Music—for Plato and Plotinus
Fundacja Forma and University of Warsaw (Poland)

Beginning from the archive recording of Andrzej Kurylewicz’s piece—La Valse Minime, op. 56, 1996, for piano solo, performed by the composer, I intend to consider that philosophy of music, which recognizes and tries to explain why, in humanly created and performed music, time is most important. The essential question of time in music requires us to turn to the metaphysical philosophy of Plotinus and Plato.

Although Plotinus assures his readers that he is following Plato faithfully, we know that he develops Plato’s thought and transforms it into his own. But, despite numerous differences, there are some deeper similarities combining their philosophies into one manifold tradition, which is very intriguing and inspiring not only for specialists, but also for intellectuals and musicians. We cannot forget that both Plato and Plotinus were sure that music can lead to the ideal beauty, truth, goodness and being.

For Plato, music, in all its meanings, is formed by four agents: harmonia, rhythmos, melos, logos, and by the fifth agent—kairos, which means proper, adequate or critical time. Time in music can be “made” or “found”, because music exists on all levels of reality. In its source, however, the existence of music means the existence of spiritual beings, the transcendent ideas. Participation in music gives the human individual a possibility of going beyond time towards spiritual, eternal beings, whose presence is most perfect, full of life in to the highest degree and deeply interesting. Music almost offers the human being eternity, but music needs time.

Plotinus continues quite a few of the thoughts of Plato. Although his views on the nature of time seem to be different from the views of Plato (for Plato time is the regular motion of the heavens, or the recognition of such regularity, while for Plotinus it is the life of the soul), Plotinus speaks of intelligible music as the model of sensible music and in this meaning every single sensible thing, even though it needs time and space, offers us eternity. But this rule refers only to natural things like the sounds of rain, wind or birds singing, which are precious and perfect as such, on their level. Humanly created or performed sounds, meanings and the all human music can be wrong or false, and in order to get better or more just, it demands of us the highest sensitivity, imagination, memory, craft, will and intellect, which is impossible without an understanding of time.

Plato’s Socrates says in Phaedo (107c):

“But, my friends, we ought to bear in mind, that if the soul is immortal, we must care for it, not only in respect to this time, which we call life, but in respect to all time, and if we neglect it, the danger now appears to be terrible. (…) Now, since the soul is seen to be immortal, it cannot escape from evil or can be saved in any other way than by becoming as good and wise as possible.”

I plan to refer to: Enneads I, III, V and VI by Plotinus, and the Phaedo, Phaedrus, Republic, Philebus, Symposium and Timaeus by Plato.

Mark J. Lovas:
Plato and Emotion: Revelation, Frustration, Judgment
The University of Pardubice (Czech Republic)

When we remember a person, an event, or words, they can take on a new meaning and significance even years after their original occurrence. The new emotions we experience seem to reveal the true nature of what happened yesterday or twenty years ago.
Other emotions trouble us. They seem to persist, lingering at the fringes of consciousness, even while stubbornly refusing to reveal their meaning.

Plato has been said to hold the view that emotions are judgments. How can such a view encompass the phenomena described above?

Suppose we desire The Good, and will accept no substitutes. Or, we simply desire to be happy—whatever the true nature of human happiness may be. These desires are, by their nature (and given our limitations) always incomplete. As Plato says in the *Philebus*, we do not stop hoping—all of our lives.

The true nature of the good and bad in our lives demands our attention, fascinates us, and takes our breath away. Yet, the true nature always slips from our grasp. Things are more complicated than we can realize, and for that reason our emotional lives don’t just stop. Socratic ignorance implies that our lives will always be emotionally rich.

I propose to develop this line of thought as a way of understanding Plato’s view of emotion. I also hope thereby to assess or come to terms with the claim that, for Plato, emotions are judgments.

Leo Catana:
Plato on Ethical Requirements and Options in the Process of Political Recognition: *Gorgias* 513a7–513c2
*University of Copenhagen (Denmark)*

Plato is among the earliest and most significant contributors to the history of political philosophy. In his *Republic*, for instance, he discussed various constitutional forms, such as monarchy, tyranny, oligarchy, aristocracy and democracy. There are, however, several other discussions in Plato’s political philosophy which cut across the one about constitutional forms. One of these other discussions addresses the following two questions: (1) How is political power transferred from one or several power-holding

agent(s) to one or several other political agents through a process of recognition and subsequent transmission of political power? (2) How does this process of political recognition affect the ethical constitution of the power-seeking politician? In my paper, I address the last question.

One may thus ask: Which are the ethical requirements to political agents seeking to obtain political power? And which ethical options are open to these agents? Plato’s *Gorgias* 510a3–514e10 addresses these issues, for instance 513a7–c2:

“If you think that some person or other will hand you a craft of the sort that will give you great power in this city while you are unlike [*anomoion*] the regime [*politeia*], whether for better or for worse, then in my opinion, Callicles, you’re not well advised. You mustn’t be their imitator [*mimētēn*] but be naturally like them [*autophyōs homoion toutois*] in your own person if you expect to produce any genuine result toward winning the friendship of the Athenian people and, yes, by Zeus, of Demos the son of Pyrilampes to boot. Whoever then turns you out to be most like [*homoiotaton*] these men, he will make you a politician [*politikon*] in the way you desire to be one, and an orator [*rētorikon*], too. For each group of people takes delight in speeches that are given in its own character [*ēthei*], and resent those given in an alien manner…” (Trans. Zeyl, pp. 94–95.)

Using this passage as a point of departure, I try to answer the two above questions within Plato’s *Gorgias*. In particular, I shall highlight the ethical consequences political participation that are caused by the requirement for recognition. I shall do so by contextualising some of the references and key concepts in the cited passage within Plato’s *Gorgias* and his *Alcibiades I*, to which Plato alludes in the *Gorgias*.

Several Plato scholars have recently referred to the cited passage in their accounts of Plato’s political philosophy. I shall argue that the passage is significant to an ethical concern embedded in Plato’s political philosophy, namely his concern for the ethical
individuation to which political participants expose themselves, especially young, upcoming partisans. I shall also argue that Socrates presents an alternative option to the upcoming politician by means of his notion of *sōphrosynē*, providing social detachment, integrity and engagement to the politician.

Gary Gurtler:
Plotinus on Light and Vision
*Boston College (USA)*

*Ennead IV 5 [29]* has been poorly served by translators and commentators, misreporting what Plotinus wrote and, with these mangled results, asserting that this part of his treatise on the “Problems about the Soul” is merely a disjointed series of doxographical fragments with little compelling contribution to make. More careful translation and analysis reveal something strikingly different and original. First, he gives a cogent critique of the theories of Plato and Aristotle concerning the body between day and night. Second, he substitutes his own account in terms of both sympathy and the principle of two acts, explaining vision both during the day as well as at night, notably deficient in previous accounts. Third, he derives some surprisingly original corollaries about the nature of light and the source of color.

Crystal Addey and Robert Berchman (organizers)

DIVINE POWER AND PRESENCE IN LATER PLATONISM: THEURGY, RITUAL, EPISTEMOLOGY, AESTHETICS, AND METAPHYSICS

Thomas Vidart:
The Identification with the Intelligible according to Plotinus
*Lycée Champollion, Grenoble (France)*

The aim of the paper is to study Plotinus’ interpretation of the precept underlined by Plato in the *Theaetetus* (176a-b) which invites to “become like a god”. This interpretation deals at the same time with metaphysical and ethical concerns: the divine assimilation is understood in Plotinus’ thought as an identification with the intelligible realities, which enables one to become virtuous. What is at stake in this interpretation is the status of the human being: does one remain human when one identifies with the intelligible realities? Plotinus maintains that one has to renounce the usual characteristics of the human life in order to become the intelligible realm itself. Indeed, identification with the intelligible is not mere
contemplation of the intelligible world, in which the subject remains distinct from the object. The identification leads one to be the intelligible itself and not only to resemble it. As a result, it has to be understood as a movement which is opposite to the particularization which leads one to be a human being. In the case of the identification with the intelligible, the human being ceases being a part of the sensible universe in order to be the entire intelligible world.

The movement of identification is due to desire for the intelligible realities: Plotinus insists in the treatise *On virtues* (the treatise 19 in the chronological order) on the fact that the human being and also the sensible universe imitate the intelligible world because desire leads them to do so. This imitation enables them to possess wisdom. We have then to underline a paradox: the god which is imitated does not possess the virtues that human beings have thanks to the imitation. It will be necessary in this way to know how we have to think this very particular imitation which makes the image resemble a model which is deprived of the characteristics that the image acquires by means of the imitation. Indeed, whereas one becomes virtuous when one identifies with the intelligible, the latter is not itself virtuous.

One aspect of the answer is the fact that the imitation of the intelligible enables one to become unified because the intelligible world possesses a higher level of unity. When one contemplates the intelligible realities, one does not withdraw from oneself: one becomes more unified. The human is indeed characterised by multiplicity: according to the treatise *How the multitude of the Forms came into being, and on the Good* (the treatise 38), a kind of human being corresponds to each power of the soul. As there are for instance a sensory soul and a rational one, there are a sensory human and a rational one. The unity-in-diversity which is the specific feature of the intelligible world constitutes the model that one has to imitate in order to unify the various elements that one has within oneself. The unity of the intelligible is indeed all-inclusive. Inner unification and union with the divine are in this way two different aspects of the same process. In order to account for this process, we will have to put in emphasis the hierarchy among the different powers of the soul and therefore among the different sorts of human beings. Indeed, the unification implies that one makes the higher part prevail over the other ones. The analogy with the different parts which constitute a science helps us to understand how the movement of unification can be performed.

This unification is in fact a simplification: when one ascends towards the intelligible, one leaves the different aspects which make one multiple. It leads one to a new life, which is precisely the life of the gods. According to the treatise *On happiness* (the treatise 46), one has indeed to adopt a new life: one has to coincide with the life of the Intellect which is a perfect one. This coincidence implies that one abandons one’s former life which is a human one. As a result, we will have to study what it means to live the life of the gods themselves in Plotinus’ thought.

Bruce J. Maclennan:
Psychological Effects of Henosis
*University of Tennessee, Knoxville (USA)*

Jung’s term “individuation”, which refers to the process of becoming psychologically *individuus*, that is, undivided or indivisible, could almost serve as a translation of *henôsis*. Practices in analytical psychology, such as active imagination, have direct analogies in theurgy and are directed toward similar ends. In this talk I will explore these parallels in order to understand better the means and ends of ancient theurgical practice. In particular, I will discuss the experience and effect of henôsis from the perspective of analytical psychology.

Panagiotis Pavlos:
Dionysius the Areopagite: A Christian Theurgist?
*University of Oslo (Norway)*

A mainstream tendency in our scholarly communities is to see the works of Dionysius the Areopagite through the lenses of the
Neoplatonic currents of his times. Modern research offers relatively few opportunities of a per se consideration and evaluation of the Areopagitic contributions to the Late Antique and Early Christian thought. It seems that a particular consensus has been established in research: namely, to resort to Proclean, or Iamblichean—for the sake of the present discussion on theurgy—, influences whenever one is about to inquire into Dionysius’ philosophical and theological paths.

The scope of what is about to be presented in this paper expands over the following hypothesis. Despite the linguistic affinities and the several conceptual appropriations, Dionysius’ premises remain radically different from Neoplatonism, both in terms of the sacramental tradition he recapitulates and the wider Christian metaphysical contours he adheres to. This hypothesis would need to be supported by the assumption that, whoever the Areopagite was, he had baptized himself in the liturgical reality of a “living spring” that offers “living water” and grants eternity. This is a reality immutable until today, as both the Corpus Areopagiticum and the Christian Orthodox liturgical tradition confirm.

In my paper I shall offer preliminary evidence on why one should not make the following mistakes in interpreting theurgy (θεουργία) in Dionysius’ thought. Namely: a) to identify Dionysian theurgy with the long Neoplatonic, and Hellenic, broadly speaking, theurgical tradition and practice, b) to consider theurgy a human activity, even if performed by men who have been purified according to the appropriate for that matter Neoplatonic rites, c) to take theurgy according to the Areopagite as another “special branch of magic”, to use the words of Eric Dodds, and d) to confuse theurgy with hierurgy (ἱερουργία).

I shall argue that, throughout the Corpus Dionysiacum, theurgy is a term exclusively used by the author to refer either to the works of Christ in His earthly historical presence, or to the whole divine providential, creative, sustaining and divinizing activity and work of God. Consequently, for Dionysius a theurgist could not be anyone else but Christ himself. It is in this regard that I shall argue against Gregory Shaw’s view that Dionysian theurgy is just an example of Iamblichus’ theurgical account. Part of my criticism develops on the fundamental Dionysian distinction between theurgy and hierurgy.
unlimited water of the universe” (Cortège pour le corbeau, 1980; book 1991). The fluids of life have their higher expression in the aurum potabile, the drinkable gold of the alchemists, which can be associated with the nectar of the gods served by Ganymede, a key figure in Marteau’s universe. With this purpose, we comment on passages from Les muses du serpent (1974), Voyage au verseau (1979), Interlude (1981), Mont-Royal (1981), Cortège pour le corbeau (1991), Liturgie (1992), and finally Liturgy IV (2002).

Alessandra Beccarisi:
Ulrich of Strasbourg on Beauty
Università del Salento (Italy)

Ulricus de Strasbourg, Albert the Great’s pupil, devoted a special chapter of his De summo bono to beauty. It may even be called the treatise on beauty, that contains, according to C. Barrett, the quintessence of aesthetic transcendentalism.

On the basis of recent critical editions my contribution aims at describing and analyzing lib. II, tract. 3 of De Summo Bono, with particular attention to the sources (Albert the Great, Pseudo-Dionysius).

Ota Gál:
Beauty of Intellect and the Notion of Number in Plotinus
Université de Fribourg (Switzerland),
Charles University, Prague (Czech Republic)

In this paper I shall present the notion of number as described by Plotinus in Ennead VI.6 as a shortcut for the specific unity in multiplicity which is Intellect and therefore also for its beauty. I shall argue the Plotinus tries to explain why Intellect is the most unified multiplicity and the primary beauty from several interconnected perspectives:

1) There exists a specific connectedness of different forms with each other, and with the whole of Intellect. All the forms are to be thought similar to theorems of science, which each contain all other axioms and the whole of the science. As each part in Intellect is all the other parts and the whole of it, everything is in a sense one in Intellect, although it is at the same time many. This reason for the Intellect’s unity is given from the perspective of the nature of intelligible objects.

2) Some of the forms are not only united with all the others, but unite other forms in the sense of being superordinate to them, i.e. they are genera. But some forms are not only genera, but also principles, namely the primary kinds. This means that all the other forms necessarily partake in them on order to exist at all, and to exist as what they are as opposed to what they are not. They even constitute all the forms in the sense that these can be viewed as the highest genera unfolded. In this sense the highest kinds contain the whole of Intellect and unite it.

3) Intellect is a special subject-object relation, namely such that it also implies the plurality of forms. Intellection is in this sense not only the source of Intellect’s multiplicity, but also unites it, as all its objects of thought are based on its own intellectional self-relation. Plotinus develops this argument from the perspective of the nature of the act of intellection itself.

4) Intellect is united by its underlying “structure” on which it is based and which it brings into life with its intellectional activity. This structure is identified with number in Ennead VI.6, where forms are said to be beautiful because they are numbers. I shall interpret these passages from VI.6 as connecting beauty with the structural delimitation of forms.

5) A genetic perspective may be added to these reasons. Intellect is born as a desire for the One which is actualized in an attempt to think the One, resulting in thinking an image of it, which Intellect contains and is. In other words, the One is present in Intellect as an image or a trace and Intellect does the second best thing with it—it thinks it. Intellect is thus unified also by the fact that it contains and is an image of the One, which it breaks into multiplicity, as it is posterior to the One.

As indicated, these reasons are interconnected. In its
Genesis Intellect receives an imprint of the One (cf. 5 above), which is itself one, but one in being and according to this one Being becomes number and is a preliminary sketch of all the forms (cf. 4 above). In this process Intellect is constituted precisely as Intellect, i.e. it thinks itself, and unfolds gradually (cf. 2 and 3 above) into the complete living being, i.e. into all forms, starting from the highest kinds, which were always already present with Being (cf. 2 above). In the language of *Ennead* VI.6, Intellect becomes number unfolded and all forms as substantial numbers are born on the model of the one. But the contents of Intellect are themselves intelligible, so they cannot but be one distinct only by their powers, i.e. also by their otherness, and not by being in a different place (cf. 1 above).

The proposed reading of *Ennead* VI.6 will offer a much more responsive interpretation of the value of multiplicity for beauty suggesting that in Intellect multiplicity potentiates beauty and that unified number might be said to be less beautiful than inclusive number.

José M. Zamora Calvo (organizer)

**MYTH, MYSTERY, AND EXEGETICAL PRACTICE IN THE NEOPLATONIC TRADITION**

Antoni Ładziński:

The Meaning of Symbol and Allegory in Porphyry’s “De Antro Nympharum”

*Cardinal Stephan Wyszynski University in Warsaw (Poland)*

*De Antro Nympharum*, according to R. Lamberton, is the only preserved ancient literary critical tractate and example of a Neoplatonic mystical allegoresis. My interest in the present paper concerns the usage of the term σύμβολον in the *De Antro* and Porphyry’s view of allegory as a hidden meaning in the mystical sense. I will first elaborate the usage of σύμβολον in the *De Antro*. There are two significations of the word: the first is a kind of description of the meaning e.g. the cave being a symbol of the cosmos (σύμβολον κόσμου). This is the most frequent usage and also the most common sense of the symbol in Western culture. There is also, however, a second usage of σύμβολον: certain symbols are a kind of “attribute” which strengthen the meaning of another symbol e.g.: and which symbol [here the Tyrian refers to craters and amphoras] would be more suitable (οἰκείότερον) for souls (ψυχάς) descending to rebirth [symbolized by nymphs] and closely
connected with the body? (De Antro 14). 1 The author achieves a similar meaning using σύμβολον with the genitive—stony craters and amphoras shall be the symbols of water nymphs (σύμβολα ύδριάδων νυμφῶν—De Antro 13). In the latter, the syntactic connection with the genitive has a different significance than that in σύμβολον κόσμου: here we cannot argue that (according to Porphyry) craters and amphoras represent nymphs, the hidden meaning is neither the nymphs nor the souls, but instead indicate the way of interpreting the nymphs. The relationship between vessels and nymphs can be described, however, as a “symbol [vessels] of the symbol [nymphs – souls]” which requires a reflection on Porphyry’s imagination and way of thinking. I suggest that in the above-mentioned instances, σύμβολον has similar semantics as in the earliest testimonies of its usage: the half of the object which confirms its authenticity (for example in the trade). In De Antro symbols are therefore always connected with one other, they receive their signification in a specific context. Another element of the passage indicates the meaning, and is often a criterion for the exegete: the cave can symbolize both the sensible and the spiritual world, but existence of the stream inside the cavern is an argument for the sensible one. In other words, allegory is built from the elements which receive their signification from the connection with the others.

There are also additional problems with the Tyrian’s usage of σύμβολον. In chapter 19, where he summarizes the meaning, he states: They [the ancients] did not call all the bees souls coming to rebirth, but those which are going to live in the just way. At the later point, however, the exegete writes: the honeycomb and bees are suitable symbols for water nymphs (so honeycomb and bees are in similar relationship to the nymphs as craters and amphoras). Thus the place of the bees in “the net”, connecting the elements of the passage, provides another difficulty in our understanding of Porphyry’s hermeneutics: whether bees symbolize “just souls” or whether they strengthen the meaning of the nymphs.

My purpose in the present paper is to firstly analyse the examples of the different usage of σύμβολον. I will consequently reconstruct Porphyry’s full reading out of the Homeric passage.

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1 Hereafter my own translation.
José María Zamora Calvo: 
Reading the Statesman Myth from the Proclean Approach

Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (Spain)

In the Statesman (268d8–274d), Plato confronts us with the myth of the two types of primitive men: one living in the Golden Age, during the reign of Kronos, and the other at the start of the reign of Zeus. The first Age was ruled directly by the gods, and as in Hesiod, an idyllic widespread peace in it, with happiness and abundance among men living a life of pure nature (271c8). On the other hand, the second age represents a different kind of life, as the result of the autonomous motion of the world (272d6). Proclus considers that the Platonic myth should be interpreted allegorically, i.e. with reference to other truths through a narrative medium and with reference to the Timaeus. For him the “reign of Kronos” is simply the intelligible reign, while the “cycle of Zeus” is the physical world.

However, as Baltes (1976–1978: II.49) points out, the Statesman myth is a “thorn in the side” for those who interpret Plato and attempt to develop a single doctrine of Platonic thought since, although it has many details and terms in common with the Timaeus, it presents significant divergence from them. The aim of this paper is to attempt to discover the “thorns” which may be encountered all along the hermeneutic route taken by Proclus, for whom the writings of Plato form a coherent whole. Thus, to explain and elucidate the making of the world in the Timaeus, the Platonic Diadochus cites excerpts from other dialogues including the Philebus (23–31) (in Ti. I.259.27, 262.30, 315.15, 384.24, 403.18, 423.22) and the Statesman (in Ti. I.253.19, 260.14, 312.18, 315.23.). Proclus is aware that the context is a determining factor when clarifying the terminology used.

However, Proclus’ exegesis differs from Plato’s proposal in the Statesman (272c1–4). In the reign of Kronos, men did not need to work to guarantee their survival, so that they had plenty of free time which gave them the ideal opportunity to discuss a particular theme not only among themselves but also with the animals: they exercised the myth among themselves, not philosophy. Precisely the proof that Kronos is truly the supreme dialectic stems from the fact that men discussed with each other and even with the animals, which Proclus considers to be the identifying trait of true dialectic. However, this Statesman exegesis is debatable, since it contrasts with the definition of dialectic in the earlier dialogues and it is difficult to establish a link between the discussion and dialectic which uses procedures of division and re-composition.
Crystal Addey: Divine Power, Immanence and Transcendence in Plotinus, Porphyry and Iamblichus

University of St Andrews (United Kingdom)

This paper will explore the concept of divine power in the philosophy of Plotinus, Porphyry and Iamblichus through examination of: (1) the subtle dialectic between divine immanence and transcendence within their works; (2) the notions of continuous hierarchy and procession which underpin their metaphysics, ontology, ethics and epistemology; and (3) their frameworks of multiple causation which underlie their metaphysics and ontology. Focusing particularly on Plotinus’ Treatise against the Gnostics, Porphyry’s (now fragmentary works) Against the Christians and Philosophy from Oracles, and Iamblichus’ De Mysteriis, the paper will consider similarities and points of convergence between Plotinian, Porphyrian and Iamblichean concepts of divine power and the implications of such conceptions for the roles of theurgy and ritual practices within Neoplatonism. Exploring the philosophical, cultural and intellectual contexts of their accounts of divine power, including pagan and Christian interaction and polemic during the period, the paper will examine the relationship and framework of divine immanence and transcendence in the works of these philosophers and the contexts of their differing emphases on immanence or transcendence. I hope to demonstrate that simultaneous transcendence and immanence of the divine was a key axiom in the metaphysics, theology, ontology, ethics and epistemology of Plotinus, Porphyry and Iamblichus which underpins their notions of continuous hierarchy and procession. These shared concepts of divine power, immanence and transcendence formed their basis and foundation of their various critiques of monotheistic theologies which were gaining traction during late antiquity, such as various sects subsumed under the rubric “Gnosticism” and early Christianity.

Robert M. Berchman: Origen of Alexandria. Exegesis, Contemplative Prayer, and the Limits of Language

Foro di Studi Avanzati Gaetano Massa, Roma (Italy), Institute of Advanced Theology, Bard College (USA)

This enquiry has four objectives: 1) to describe the relationship between exegesis, prayer and meaning; 2) to analyze exegesis and prayer within the limits of thought and language; 3) to interpret an aesthetics of contemplative prayer; and 4) to map how and why non-propositional mind and non-discursive language surfaces whenever mind (logos) maps Mind (Logos) through exegesis and contemplative prayer.
Origen’s reading of Scripture is not only similarly exegetical and contemplative but instructive of a later Neoplatonic and Christian noetic perception and praxis of prayer. Origen utilizes a later Platonic-Aristotelian trope: the limits of thought and language and a distinction between ordinary and ideal language. Since, the highest truths cannot be expressed through ordinary thought and language, only ideal thought and language “displays” Logos through logos. Acquisition of gnothi seauton causally triggers: 1) an abandonment of an empirical self, enframed by causal possibility, confined within sense and sensibility, and limited to ordinary language; and 2) the acquisition of a transcendent self, open to logical possibility, an unconfined intellect and intelligibility, and access to an ideal language that can attain a union with the divine. These claims rest on the acceptance of the general picture made familiar by recent scholarship of an Origen setting out to make the Bible intelligible by means of reasoning philosophically and theologically. This was the same goal confronted by Philo and Clement which is why Origen was attracted to their writings so strongly. But unlike Philo and Clement, he did not stop there. He proceeded to work out a much more experimental and meditative mode of exegesis and prayer. Here episteme for Origen discloses a God and Logos that cannot be “said” or spoken of in ordinary but only “shewn” through an ideal thought and language which is prayer. A deciding factor in assessing Origen’s philosophy of mind and language from this perspective lies in his “intentionality thesis”. A related factor is his “textual multi-valence thesis” which proposes multiple levels of contemplative intentionality when reading Scripture. With both theses, Origen may in all these senses be said to have invented philosophy as an exegetical-prayer activity—for Christians. Since a connection between exegesis and contemplative prayer was a postulate also shared by Plotinus, Augustine, this paper may also contribute to mind and language studies on exegesis and prayer in these traditions.

Gary Gabor:
Boethius and Later Greek Neoplatonism on Forms, God, and the Consolations of Contemplation and Philosophy
Hamline University (USA)

One contentious point in scholarship on the 6th century CE Latin philosopher Boethius is the extent of influence of later Greek post-Iamblichean Platonism on his philosophical doctrines and writings. While it is taken as certain that at least Plotinian, Porphyrian, and Iamblichean concepts had a strong influence on both his Christian theological tracts, his translations of and commentaries on works of Aristotle, and his final magnum opus composed in prison in c. 524 CE The Consolation of Philosophy, less well-established are (1) exactly the means of transmission of, especially, post-Porphyrian ideas, especially that of Iamblichus, and the specific character of their influences in Boethius’ work and thought, and (2) whether Boethius was aware of and influenced by any later Athenian or Alexandrian Greek Platonism, such as that of contemporaries or near-contemporaries like Proclus, the Pseudo-Dionysius, or Ammonius Hermiae. While certain distinctive features of later Athenian Platonism are notably absent from the thought of Boethius, especially any evidence of the henadic metaphysics that came to be predominant in Athenian circles, other aspects, such as certain means by which Boethius conceives of and understands procession and reversion appear to provide some evidence that he may have been influenced by other ideas espoused by contemporary Greek Platonists. Further, certain aspects of Boethius’ commentaries on Aristotle Organon, especially the second commentaries which Boethius describes as correcting a previous erroneous reliance upon earlier Latin Platonists such as Marius Victorinus that Boethius presents as impairing his first commentaries on texts like Porphyry’s Isagoge, have been suggested by scholars as demonstrating awareness on Boethius’ part of commentaries like that of his Alexandrian contemporary Ammonius Hermiae’s own teachings and lectures on Porphyry, Aristotle, and other texts studied in the Alexandrian school. This has been vigorously denied by other interpreters of
Boethius, most notably John Marenbon, who have recently argued that no such evidence of influence from post-Iamblichean Greek Platonism is detectable in the works of Boethius.

As I will argue, however, there are significant flaws in the arguments of Marenbon and others, due to critical misunderstandings of the sorts of metaphysical and epistemological doctrines espoused by Platonists in the Alexandrian school. This necessitates a reevaluation of later Platonic influence on Boethius. In particular, I examine three topics—(1) certain aspects of Boethius’ account of perception and intellection of forms, and the evidence on which these may have depended upon later Greek accounts of forms and contemporary; (2) the theological use that Boethius makes of these and allied concepts of participation, procession, and the reversion of creatures back to their ontological source in Boethius’ theological and philosophical writings; and (3) reasons for the absence of certain aspects of later Greek Platonism—especially the doctrine of the henads—and a possibly explanatory reasons for that absence if Boethius’ main source for knowledge of contemporary Greek Platonism came from Alexandrian circles, in which the theory of the henads was also significantly less prominent, than for instance if his knowledge depended on work in the soon to be repressed, and in some senses also more institutionally secretive, Athenian school. Throughout, I argue that an improved understanding of later Greek Platonism as has developed over recent decades on scholarship, also allows us to better understand the significance and features of Boethius’ Latin Neoplatonism, which served as one of the main conduits of philosophical influence and transmission for later Christian philosophical theology in the Latin middle ages.

Jenny Messenger:
Crests of a Range that was Obscured: Suzanne Lilar on Divine Echoes in Poetry and Myth
University of St Andrews (United Kingdom)

The Belgian playwright, novelist and essayist Suzanne Lilar (Ghent, 1901—Brussels, 1992) saw echoes of divine presence in the surface of the world that could awaken the soul’s nostalgic longing for another, Platonic reality. She described encounters with these traces as “marvellous moments” (les moments merveilleux, Lilar 1986), which might arise when, for example, taking off in a plane, reading poetry, or recalling the familiar structures of myth. In *Journal de l’Analogue* (1954), for example, Lilar focuses on poetry as one of the most potent means of approaching a higher reality, through the analogous connections made possible by images already imprinted on the soul. Though Lilar’s conception of a higher reality is rooted in Platonic and Neoplatonic philosophy, she prioritises poetry as a means of accessing this reality. Notably, she also links Plotinus and Porphyry together with later writers like Swedenborg and Novalis as being “visionary” poets first and foremost, rather than philosophers (Lilar 1950).

Lilar’s understanding of divine presence in poetry and myth hinges on the idea that Platonic and Neoplatonic ideas have been absorbed even by those who are not consciously aware of them. In *Le Couple* (1963, trans. Griffin 1967), an exploration of several exemplary relationships from Western history, including Plato and Dion, Lilar argues that Platonic *eros* is so embedded in Western literature and culture, it has permeated the consciousness of those who otherwise possess no knowledge of Platonism. She relates this to the Platonic doctrine of *anamnesis*, the awakening of latent memories from previous incarnations of the soul, and notes that Plato developed a doctrine of love which “though degraded in transmission, has gone so deep into our culture you find traces of it even in the language of the man in the street” (Lilar 1967).

Similarly, Lilar distinguishes between false myths, which are culturally learned, and timeless myths, which enter an individual’s psyche from within: “to know them it is not necessary to have read or heard them; they sleep and germinate in our deepest Self in the form of images, symbols, haunting ideas, aspirations” (Lilar 1967). These myths are part of an ancient landscape of the human soul, now hidden from view: “I have sometimes recognized the pattern belonging to a family of myths and have seemed to see emerging the crests of a range that was obscured—or the lost continent of an ancient and all-embracing doctrine” (Lilar 1967). In such moments, Lilar describes a sense of exile from her “real country” as she approaches a transcendent reality (Lilar 1979),
akin to Plotinus’s description of the soul’s desire for its homeland (*Enneads* I.VI.8).

In this paper, I will therefore examine the extent to which Lilar considers reading and interpreting poetry and myth to be a means of achieving a cognitive state conducive to divinisation. Drawing on recent Neoplatonic scholarship on Plotinus (Clark 2016), on Neoplatonic *eros* (Vaslakis 2015; Markus 2016) and on Lilar’s oeuvre (Bainbrigge 2004; Acke 2015), I will explore Lilar’s notion of divine presence in relation to poetry and myth using select examples from both her fiction and non-fiction, arguing that her approach is rooted in Neoplatonic concepts of original unity and immanence, and suggesting that she views the divine traces in poetry and myth as a path towards divinisation.

**Jozef Matula (organizer)**

**PLATONISM IN LATE BYZANTINUM**

**Georgios Arabatzis:**
*Middle Platonism and Academic Skepticism in Late Byzantium*
*National and Kapodistrian University of Athens (Greece)*

The communication will deal with the ideas of Middle Platonism and Academic Skepticism that appear in the philosophy of late Byzantium. This re-emergence of Platonic forms of thought other than the basic Neoplatonism will be studied in an effort to show how Byzantine philosophy is to be demarcated from a research program that focuses mainly on the notion of a dominant Neoplatonic influence. Thinkers like Metochites, Planudes, and others will constitute the paradigmatic cases to be examined in the consequent analysis.

**Jozef Matula:**
*Theodoros Metochites’ Reading of Plato*
*Palacký University, Olomouc (Czech Republic)*

Theodoros Metochites (1270–1332), a Grand Logothete, was one of the outstanding figures of Byzantine letters and culture in the 14th century. His literary and scholarly output is vast, it contains texts on astronomy, poetry, rhetoric, essays, education,
epistolography and philosophy (paraphrases of various Aristotelian treatises). The main aim of the paper is to focus on Theodoros Metochites’ reading of Plato’s philosophy on the background of his comparison of Plato and Aristotle. Metochites’ praise of Aristotle conforms to a long and broad tradition, as Christians and Platonists had always been more impressed by Aristotle the natural philosopher than metaphysician. Metochites represents this tendency in Byzantine thought, the praise of Aristotle is directed towards his excellence in the fields dealing with the empirical knowledge and so Aristotle’s authority is limited to natural sciences and logic. On the other hand, Metochites criticises the obscurity of Aristotle’s language and his understanding of mathematics, rhetoric, politics and metaphysics. This opens the questions of Metochites’ inclination to one of the two common strategies: to show that the disagreements over fundamental principles are more apparent than real (the Neoplatonic commentators) or to demonstrate Aristotle’s incompetence in these disciplines. A special attention will be paid to Metochites’ understanding of the immortality of the soul (Pythagorean influences) and his epistemological notions on the background of his reading of Platonic tradition (theory of knowledge as recollection).

Florin Leonte:
Plato, Rhetoric, and Political Renewal in Late Byzantium

**Palacký University, Olomouc (Czech Republic)**

Faced with the impending collapse of the state, during the last decades of the Byzantine Empire, Greek scholars tried to envisage political reforms that would lead to the containment of territorial losses and a revival of Byzantium. Especially during the reigns of Manuel II Palaiologos (r. 1391–1425) and John VIII Palaiologos (1425–1448) the attempts to safeguard the state were paralleled by debates over deep changes in the ruling institutions and of the dominant political ideology. The Byzantine court in Constantinople became a place where various groups of Byzantine intellectuals vied for discursive authority. If several scholars supported claims for the preeminence of the Church in matters of state, other intellectuals rather adopted different paths of reform. In this debate, along other philosophical schools, Plato and Platonism played a key role in articulating political ideas. This paper will discuss two late Byzantine texts in which Plato was heavily used as a model: first the *Dialogue on Marriage with the Empress Mother* (c. 1396) by the Emperor Manuel II Palaiologos and second, *A Memorandum on the Situation in the Peloponnese* (early fifteenth c.) by George Gemistos Plethon. The first composition imitates Platonic dialogues and tries to answer the question of whether marriage is beneficial for a ruler. Although eventually the problem posed by the interlocutors receives a solution, there is a number of ambiguities that ultimately subvert the apparently key message of the text. The other text by Plethon propose several reforms to be implemented in the province of Peloponnese, seen both as the cradle of the Hellenic nation and as a potential place for the rebirth of Byzantium. These reforms that bear the influence of Plato’s ideas aimed at the creation of new social classes divided according to each one’s main activities: leadership, army, or agriculture. The present paper will focus on both the use of Platonic ideas in the political debates of late Byzantium as well as the use of Platonic dialogues as a rhetorically efficient form for conveying political messages.

Georgios Steiris:
A Dispute among 15th Century Byzantine Scholars over Universals and Particulars

**National and Kapodistrian University of Athens (Greece)**

The Greek speaking philosophical community throughout the fifteenth century got embroiled in the dispute between the partisans of Plato and those of Aristotle. Of particular interest is a dispute over universals and particulars. Byzantine scholars read Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy through the lens of Neoplatonism in order to reappraise a highly debated issue. Namely, Plethon attacked, particularly in his *De differentiis Platonis et Aristotelis,*
Aristotle on the issue of substance. According to Pletho, Aristotle wrongly argued that the particulars are primary and proper realities. Following Plato, Pletho held that Forms and genera are preponderant realities. Pletho accused Georgios Scholarios that in his Contra Plethonem he avoided to argue against Pletho’s positions concerning the Platonic Forms. Scholarios did not reproduce and comment on the Aristotelian critique on the Forms because, according to Pletho, he was fully aware that Aristotle’s arguments are weak and lack coherence. During the 1450s, Cardinal Bessarion attempted, in his Adversus Plethomem de substantia, to reconcile Pletho’s advocacy on the primacy in being of the universal, with the Aristotelian doctrine of the primacy of the particular. Theodore Gaza got engaged in the debate and wrote a short treatise in which he refuted Plato’s position on essence. Gaza, probably, felt the need to fill the lacuna which Scholarios left, since he did not comment on the debated issue in his Contra Scholarii defensionem Aristotelis. As a result Gaza replied to Pletho, who insulted Scholarios and those who shared the same views with him. It is also obvious that Gaza was not satisfied from Bessarion’s conciliatory stance. Michael Apostolis felt offended, because Gaza dared to ridicule Pletho and the Platonists, although even Scholarios preferred to stay silent and did not confront Pletho on the disputed issue of the Forms. Apostolis deliberately chose to reply to Gaza with a short treatise which he dedicated to Bessarion. Later Andronicus Callistus, who was Gaza’s cousin and Bessarion’s protégé, launched a fervent attack on Apostolis in order to defend the Aristotelian view on universals and particulars. Demetrius Chalkondyles and Nikolas Secundinus also expressed their views in favor of Gaza. Although Bessarion attempted to compromise the partisans of Plato and those of Aristotle, the dispute continued until the first years of 1460’s.

This paper will explore Ficino’s engagement with Plato’s Phaedo, devoted to the topic of the immortality of the soul, which was probably the main source for Ficino’s claim that our individual self never dies. For this reason, we might have expected Ficino to write a full commentary on this dialogue; however, he produced just a short Epitome (5 pages in the printed edition). The reason for this, he says, was that the arguments of the Phaedo were included and extensively commented on in his magnum opus, the Platonic Theology, published in 1482. I shall analyze the role of his In Phaeodonem Epitome in relationship to both the Platonic Theology and his commentary notes on Plotinus’s Enneads IV.7, which is heavily inspired by the Phaedo. Most importantly, I shall try to identify the philosophical and exegetical relevance of the Epitome in itself and its specific role in Ficino’s literary output.
Wednesday, June 14 Early Modern Platonism
14:30–16:30

Hanna Gentili:
Platonism and Religious Debates in Early Modern Italy. A Comparison between Marsilio Ficino (1433–1499) and Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola (1469–1533) on the Nature of Love and Prophecy
The Warburg Institute (United Kingdom)

With their opposite views about the relationship between Platonism and Christianity, Marsilio Ficino and Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola exemplify the complex dynamics between philosophy and religion in fifteenth-century Italy. Ficino's ideal of unity was indeed opposed by Gianfrancesco Pico, who dismissed any attempt at reconciliation between the ancient philosophers and Christian religion. This paper focuses on the debates on the nature of love and prophecy as two of the key issues that animated the most famous cultural circles of the time. The debates involved a number of personalities, including Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463–1494), Girolamo Benivieni (1453–1542) and his brother Domenico (1460–1507). The Ficinian notion of love, permeated by Platonic motifs, became the object of explicit criticism by Giovanni Pico and Girolamo Benivieni. It embodied precisely that convergence between Christianity and Platonism that was to be rejected by Gianfrancesco Pico. On the other hand, the debate on the nature of love and prophecy as two of the key issues that animated the most famous cultural circles of the time. The debates involved a number of personalities, including Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463–1494), Girolamo Benivieni (1453–1542) and his brother Domenico (1460–1507). The Ficinian notion of love, permeated by Platonic motifs, became the object of explicit criticism by Giovanni Pico and Girolamo Benivieni. It embodied precisely that convergence between Christianity and Platonism that was to be rejected by Gianfrancesco Pico. On the other hand, the debate on the nature and the origins of prophecy was central in both Ficino's and Gianfrancesco's philosophical views. The study of this debate discloses similarities and differences in the ways in which they related to Platonism as well as in their dialogue with contemporary Jewish thinkers. Through the lens of discussions on love and prophecy this paper intends to highlight some of the defining characteristics underlying Ficino's and Gianfrancesco Pico's different approaches to Platonism. This will also help us understand how they shaped the religious and interreligious dialogue in early modern Italy.

Wednesday, June 14 Early Modern Platonism
14:30–16:30

Angie Hobbs:
The Erotic Magus: Daimons and Magic in Ficino’s “de Amore”
University of Sheffield (United Kingdom)

Ficino's De amore is at least as much an independent treatise on love as the commentary on Plato's Symposium that it professes to be: a seductive concoction of Plato, the Hermetic Corpus, the Neoplatonists, Augustine, Aquinas and others, to which Ficino has added his own distinctively alchemical and astrological spices. Yet it is nevertheless often at its most powerful and richly suggestive in its capacity to illuminate certain Platonic and Neoplatonic features, and in this paper I argue that one of the most important and continuing legacies of the De amore is the light it sheds on Plato's conception of erōs as both magician and daimōn, a necessary mediator between mortal and divine realms, both revealing and strengthening the usually hidden harmonies in apparently disparate subject matter. In doing so, Ficino helps us focus on and understand aspects of Plato which current analytical fashions in philosophy either deliberately ignore or unconsciously overlook. Although Plato usually portrays magic and magicians in an unfavourable light, he does hold that in certain cases it can be beneficent, revelatory rather than deceptive. Ficino highlights these benefits and shows the deep Platonic roots of his own conception of a “natural” magic which is amenable to rational explanation, exploration, utilization and empirical testing; central to Ficino's analysis is the distinction he makes between the Greek daimōnes, such as erōs, which he calls “good daemons” and the bad daemons/demons of Christianity.

There are also vital Neoplatonic roots in Ficino's account of a cosmic whole connected by daimonic activity. In De amore 6.10, Ficino writes that in Plato's Symposium the priestess Diotima calls love a “magician” (magus) “because the whole power of magic consists in love. The work of magic is the attraction of one thing to another by way of a certain affinity of nature.” Here, Ficino is not only directly referencing Symposium 202–3; he is also indebted to Plotinus Enneads 4.4, Porphyry On Abstinence II.38 and to a tract
on sacrifice, theurgy and magic by Proclus which Ficino translated as *De sacrificio*. According to Proclus, heaven and earth are magically linked by natural forces of likeness and sympathy, and this allowed the sages of old—as Proclus terms them—to bring divine powers into the mortal realm.

The importance of Ficino’s interest in the *daimôn éros* in the *Symposium*, however, is not simply the light it sheds on Plato and the Neoplatonists, or what it tells us about Ficino’s own syncretic but still original vision. One particularly notable student of ancient philosophies and religions, including ancient daemonology, and ancient magical and alchemical practices, was Newton. Newton owned Ficino’s translation of Plato, and there is at least one place in his manuscripts where he incontrovertibly cites Ficino. Some historians of science have speculated that Newton’s fascination with ancient notions of active spirits as mediators profoundly influenced his vision in the *Principia* of a world connected by unseen physical forces acting at a distance. It is notable that Ficino himself explicitly discusses action at a distance in the form of magnetic attraction in *De amore* 6.2, at the beginning of his discussion of Diotima’s claim that éros is a *daimôn* and her account of the connective daimonic realm. It is certainly possible that Newton was intrigued by this ancient world-view, which he interpreted as being couched in metaphorical language, and wondered how such a world-view could be translated into modern scientific terms. If this is indeed the case, then Ficino’s capacity to transform our vision is formidable indeed.

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**EARLY MODERN PLATONISM**

**Salvatore Carannante:**
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Platonicos tres in Deo personas posuisse: Neoplatonic Interpretations of Trinity in
Renaissance Philosophy
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*Istituto Nazionale di Studi sul Rinascimento, Florence (Italy)*

Since Eusebius of Caesarea—deeply persuaded, along with authors like Justin, Clement of Alexandria, but also Lactantius and Augustine, that the (neo)platonistic philosophy was largely compatible with Christianity—the three hypostases, ἕν, νοῦς, ψυχή, were often interpreted as an anticipation of the three divine “persons” of Trinity, the theorization of which was, after all, deeply influenced by the original triad described in *Enneads* V 1.

The aim of this paper is to examine how this idea was reprised during the Renaissance—with the rediscovery of ancient philosophies, and especially with the platonistic revival promoted by Ficino’s translations of and commentaries on Plato, Plotinus and Proclus—and further explored in the light of the *prisca theologia*, conceived as a single ancient theological tradition that, stretching back to Zoroaster and Hermes, had included Pythagoras, Orpheus, Philolaus, Plato (but also Plotinus and the Neoplatonists, seen as the most faithful and clear interpreters) and found its fullest expression in Christianity, whose vestiges could in this way be traced much earlier. In this context, the *platonici* were considered not only as
authoritative philosophical sources but also as transmitters of religious doctrines, and particularly of the core ideas of Christian faith. Taking as terminus a quo Cusanus, who in *De principio* (but also in *De beryllo* and in *De pace fidei*) had already underlined that “hanc Trinitatem, quam Christiani credunt, utique Platonici fationtur”, the paper will focus on three key moments of the Renaissance philosophical reflection on what Edgar Wind defined as the “Pagan Vestiges of the Trinity”:

a. Marsilio Ficino’s commentaries *In Convivium*, *In Dionysium Areopagitam* and *In epistulas Pauli*, where the triad of deus, mens, anima, attributed to Plato and his interpreters, is mentioned and analyzed, along with Hermetic and Zoroastrian triads, as one of the most important pagan prefigurations of the Christian Trinity;

b. Agrippa’s *De occulta philosophia*, with special reference to the eighth chapter of the third book (entitled *Quid de divina Trinitate veteres senserint philosophi*), in which, drawing on “Augustinus atque Porphyrius”, the identification between prima universitas, prima mens and anima mundi, on the one hand, pater, filius and spiritus, on the other, is examined at length;

c. Patrizi’s *Nova de universis philosophia*, especially the ninth book of the second part (*De uno trino principio*), where the references to the three hypostases are employed to highlight the unitive, productive and order-imposing activity of the triune God upon the universe.

Great attention will be paid to the deep theological consequences implied in these perspectives, especially as far as the crucial distinction between the necessary action of God ad intra (the generation of divine personae) and his contingent activity ad extra (the creation of the world) is concerned. These implications will become evident, for example, in the audacious identification between anima mundi and Holy Spirit, suggested by Agrippa and Patrizi, but condemned since the Council of Sens, in 1141.

By means of this analysis, the paper will try not only to shed light upon a relevant topic of Renaissance metaphysical reflection, but also to highlight an important, but neglected, chapter in the history of the complex relationship between Platonism and Christianity.

Vojtěch Hladký:
The Use of Chaldaean Oracles in Patrizi’s “Nova de Universis Philosophia”
*Charles University, Prague (Czech Republic)*

It is well known that Patrizi was an important editor of the half-philosophical, half-religious fragments nowadays known as the Chaldaean Oracles. He built on the work of two earlier Byzantine philosophers and scholars, namely Psellos and Gemistos Plethon. Although significantly expanding the extent of the Oracles, he follows Plethon in ascribing these notoriously mysterious utterances to Zoroaster, who was then believed to have been the most ancient sage of all. Moreover, both Patrizi and Plethon drew inspiration from the Oracles when developing their respective philosophical systems.

The aim of the paper is to compare these two thinkers’ reception and use of the Chaldean Oracles. It will try to demonstrate that for both Patrizi and Plethon, the most attractive feature of this work is the (middle) Platonic background in which it actually originated. Particular attention will be paid to the Oracles’ possible influence on Patrizi’s own cosmology.

David Leech:
Cudworth on “Superintellectual Instinct” as a Species of “Orphic-Pythagorean” Love
*Bristol University and Cambridge Platonist Research Group, University of Cambridge (United Kingdom)*

For Cudworth the fundamental ethical motive is love. In this paper I will examine Cudworth’s concept of “superintellectual
instinct” as a natural love for or inclination to the good. Cudworth broadly distinguishes between two basic kinds of love: “Orphic-Pythagorean”, which is a “love of redundancy and overflowing fullness”, and a “love of desire”. The superior “superintellectual” instinct in humans, which is the participated likeness of God’s Love, and is both the highest perfection of humans as well as the source of morality, is classed by him as a species of “Orphic-Pythagorean” love. I argue that Cudworth gives a prominence to this higher love as a natural or “created” grace in the moral—spiritual life of a person, and that his Platonising theological perfectionism tends to demote the role of supernatural grace in his philosophical theology.

Jacques Joseph:
World Soul and the “Spirit of Nature”
Charles University, Prague (Czech Republic)

The “Spirit of Nature” is one of the more famous features of Cambridge Platonist Henry More’s philosophy and its origin in ancient notions of a World Soul is pretty well established. Yet the relation between these two concepts is far from simple and definitely deserves some attention, all the more so since we find a much more traditional World Soul in his early philosophical poems. Compared to this Universal Soul Psyche (which also corresponds to the Holy Ghost), the Spirit of Nature turns out to be very different, a blind agent “without Sense nor Animadversion” that is in a lot of respects much closer to More’s early notion of a “Mundane Spright”, a subtle, yet corporeal substance pervading the universe and acting as a “vehicle of life”.

Given the very specific place of the Spirit of Nature within More’s philosophy, I believe that a more detailed analysis of this transition and of its causes and consequences can teach us a lot about this much bigger change that occurred in More’s philosophy during the 1650s, most often described as a shift from his early gradualistic monism to a much stricter dualism. What I would like to show is that this shift, also closely related to More’s critique of his early “holenmerism” and “actinism” (as he calls these doctrines...
José C. Baracat Jr. and Suzanne Stern-Gillet (organizers)

TIME AND SPACE IN NEOPLATONISM

Benedikt Rottenecker:
Eternal Motion and the Nature of Time in Plotinus’ “On Eternity and Time”
Memorial University of Newfoundland (Canada)

Plotinus describes eternity as the life ($ζωή$) of the Intellect, “a life that abides in the same, and always has the all present to it” (III.7.3.16–17). Considering that the Intellect and the intelligible beings are usually seen as immutable this claim is rather puzzling—even more so when seeing that, for Plotinus, to look at the intelligible kosmos as life means to see it as “motion” ($κίνησις$, III.7.3.9). For Plotinus, it seems, both immutability and motion are categories that define the nature of the Intellect.

Of course, this cannot be the same kind of motion that defines all things in time. Since the Intellect is eternal and all-encompassing it cannot really move anywhere, or change for that matter. Here, “life” can therefore not mean duration or continuity in change as one could assume according to biological life, but what is meant is the activity of intellection, the divine life as described by Aristotle in Book XII of his Metaphysics. Plotinus makes clear that, when he talks about the eternal as “always existing” ($αἰὼν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀεὶ ὄντος$, III.7.4.42–43), we must not be misled into “imagining an expansion of something becoming more, and again, of something which is never going to fail” ($εἰς ἔκτασιν τοῦ πλείονος καὶ ἕτερον, III.7.6.25–26$). In other words, we must not believe that he talks about something that persists through time. Rather, “it does not have any “this and that” ($οὐκ ἔχει ὅτιον ὅτιον ἀλλο καὶ ἀλλο$); “[...] nor, then, can you apprehend anything of it as before or after” ($οὐδὲ πρότερον οὐδὲ ύστερον$, III.7.6.15–17). It does not persist through the “before and after”, in other words, through time, it is simply altogether aeternoporal. It is completely outside of time.

The life of the eternal, i.e., the life of the intelligible beings, which constitutes their eternity, is, therefore, not subject to change; even more, it is impossible for it to change, since all there is always present to it—and this “is” does not mean “that which exists (presently)” but “the all of being itself”. For it, there is nothing that has passed and, therefore, nothing that is no more; neither is there anything that will be, or is not yet.

Considering what was just said, we can also revisit the notion that the life of the intelligible beings establishes their nature as motion. Motion can, in this case, not mean change; instead, it is the eternal activity of the intelligible, going in circles, back and forth between the ideas that are always already present to it. And what is present to it is everything there is in eternity.

In this paper I take a close look at the theme of motion in the Intellect focussing on Plotinus’ treatment On Eternity and Time (III.7). I analyze in detail what he can possibly mean by the statement that the Intellect has a kind of life, and shortly draw attention to what that means for the nature of time, which Plotinus famously defines as “the life of the Soul” (III.7.11.43–45).

Rachel MacKinnon:
How Do Bodies Become Extended? An Investigation into Plotinus’ Sensible Realm
University of Toronto (Canada)

As a Platonist, Plotinus believes in a strict separation between intelligible substances and sensible objects. While for Aristotle, the distinction between the intelligible and the sensible is owed to the presence of matter, it is not so simple for Plotinus. This is for two reasons: one, he believes that intelligible substances also have...
matter, and two, he believes matter and form never actually join.
Instead, the distinction between the intelligible and the sensible is more accurately characterized by the fact that sensible objects are corporeal. Sensible objects differ from the intelligible substances (Forms, intellects, souls, logoi) by being bodies.

In order for us to understand what the sensible world looks like for Plotinus, we must therefore study the fundamental features of bodies. All objects are extended and exist in space. This carries on the Platonic tradition as found in the Timaeus, where the receptacle is posited as a third thing in which all sensible objects are contained. Thus, one of the names given to the receptacle is “space” (χώρα) and the objects within it have extension. However, little is done to explore the subject in detail. We find a more careful examination of the topic in Aristotle’s Physics IV, where he articulates his account of place as a boundary, but denies that there is anything like absolute space. The Stoics, in contrast, believe that extension is common to both bodies and space and that space exists independently as an incorporeal. In Plotinus, then, we might hope to find a distinctively Platonic account of space and extension.

It is only in recent years, however, with the growing interest in Plotinus’ natural philosophy that we’re starting to see the topic being treated at length. Discussions of the subject are typically found either in commentaries on the treatises that discuss matter and extension (II.4 and III.6) or in articles on the structure of appearances. So, for example, Paul Kalligas (2011) notes that space seems to come about because matter receives all appearances “in extension”. He suggests that the arrangement of these extended objects then gives us “the idea of space”. Space therefore comes about as a consequence of the creation of bodies and is posterior to them. Eleni Perdikouri (2014) provides a similar account in her extended commentary on II.4, in which she argues that extension is receptive of extension insofar as it belongs to bodies, but is not extended itself. Both of these authors note that an object’s extension seems to be determined by its form and arises when the form comes into contact with matter.

However, these accounts are inadequate because they leave unexplained why it is that objects acquire extension only in the sensible realm. Even though extension is determined by form and matter is receptive of extension, Plotinus does not think that matter itself is potentially extension. There is something mysterious at work here: if matter is not receptive of extension, why for all bodies share it? In this paper, I will examine what Plotinus says extension is and how it is that all objects come to be extended in the sensible realm. I want to focus on the special status of extension among the qualities that belong to sensible objects. In doing so, I will highlight the tension that exists in Plotinus’ works on matter, as an inheritor of the view that the receptacle is both space and matter. This discussion will focus primarily on passages from II.4, the second half of III.6, the criticism of the Stoics in VI.1, and the criticism of Aristotle in VI.3. In doing so, I am contributing to the increasingly popular project of exploring Plotinus’ natural philosophy and seeing what a more robust Platonic account of the physical world can look like. In particular, I hope to better understand Plotinus’ concept of space as related to bodies and their connections, which Barat Jr. (2013) believes to be the most intractable of his concepts of space. Finally, I think this allows us to re-examine the role of his arguments against matter as extension in his arguments against materialism.

László Bene:
Plotinus’ Theory of Time (Enn. III.7)
Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest (Hungary)

Ancient accounts of time are sometimes divided into cosmological and psychological theories. Plotinus develops a theory that accounts for the phenomenon of time in terms of the soul. I shall argue, however, that his theory cuts across the cosmological/psychological dichotomy. The issues of time perception and time measurement, which are prominent in Augustine’s psychological account of time, play merely a subordinate role in Plotinus. Instead, he treats the soul primarily as a cosmological principle which exercises its ordering function by means of a cognitive process, that is to say, discursive thinking. Plotinus’ theory of time relies on Plato’s thesis according to which the soul is the principle of
motion. Plotinus describes the emergence of discursive thought and time in mythical language (III.7.11). His account is frequently assimilated to Gnostic myths of fall. I shall point out that he offers an alternative description of the emergence of cosmic soul and time in the same treatise that corrects the “Gnostic” features of his myth, and intergrates the phenomenon of time into his hierarchical ontology.

Dylan M. Burns:
Does the Great Invisible Spirit Care?
Foreknowledge and Providence in the Platonizing Sethian Treatises of Nag Hammadi

Freie Universität Berlin (Germany)

The discovery of Coptic Gnostic apocalypses at Nag Hammadi, Egypt in 1945 bearing the names of works which Porphyry tells us circulated in the school of Plotinus has provided valuable new insight into the development of later Platonism. Mazur, Turner, and others have done much to help us understand how the mystical theology of these “Platonizing” Sethian treatises, particularly their language of divine forethought or a “pre-noetic” capacity, is implicated in Plotinian Neoplatonism. However, these treatises’ position on divine knowledge of the sub-divine realm—i.e., the way in which the aeonic god(s) know the rest of reality—has attracted less attention. This issue may prove particularly incisive for the “Platonizing” Sethian treatises, since the dating of their Vorlagen is disputed, and we know there to have been a marked shift within the Neoplatonic tradition regarding divine omniscience of particular beings and contingent events (rejected by Plotinus and Porphyry, embraced by Iamblichus through Ammonius). This paper will therefore examine passages about divine (fore)knowledge of individuals beyond the Godhead in Zostrianos (NHC VIII,1), Allogenes (NHC XI,3), and Marsanes (NHC X,1), particularly regarding the status of knowledge as established by the active know-er, and regarding divine care.

Svetlana Mesyats:
Unknown Doctrine of Proclus or What Kind of Souls Did Proclus Discover?
Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow (Russian Federation)

According to Marinus of Samaria (Vita Procli 23), Proclus was the author of many hitherto unknown doctrines. In particular he was the first to assert the existence of a kind of souls that are capable of seeing several ideas simultaneously and exist between the Intellect which embraces all things together by a single intuition, and the souls passing in their thoughts from one idea to another. What kind of souls does Marinus talk about? Where are they located in the multilevel Neoplatonic universe? Why did Proclus believe it necessary to introduce them into his metaphysical system? All these questions have no reliable answers till today. The first attempt to find out, what kind of souls did Proclus discover, was made by L.J. Rosan in his book The philosophy of Proclus (1949). Rosan supposed that Proclus postulated existence of the intermediate daemonic souls, which posses a special kind of intelligence (so called “purely intellectual intelligence”). Though Rosan’s hypothesis was accepted by some prominent scholars, it can hardly be true.
The more plausible hypothesis concerning Proclus’ discovery was made by H.-D. Saffrey and A.-Ph. Segonds in their Edition of Vita Procli (2002). They supposed that the new type of souls could be “hypercosmic” or “unparticipated” ones. In support of this assumption they pointed to the relevant fragment from Proclus “Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus” (in Tim. III, 251.29—252.21), where hypercosmic souls were described as a mean term between the divine Intellect and souls within cosmos. They are said to think discursively and in this regard differ from the divine Intellect, but insofar as their thought is more unified and capable of perceiving several things together, they are said to transcend encosmic souls, whose thoughts pass from one idea to another. Obvious parallels between this passage and Marinus’ testimony leave almost no doubts, that the souls discovered by Proclus are hypercosmic ones. Yet this assumption is faced with serious difficulties. First, Proclus’ metaphysics doesn’t allow existence of many hypercosmic souls. There can be only one hypercosmic Soul—the so called unparticipated monad of soul’s order. Secondly, hypercosmic souls are clearly attributed by Proclus to the previous Neoplatonic philosophers, probably to Iamblichus, so that we have no reason to treat them as his own invention.

In order to solve these difficulties I am going (1) to outline the general structure of the psychic order in Proclus and to clarify the mechanism of horizontal-vertical procession of souls; (2) to show that the term “hypercosmic” can be applied not only to the “unparticipated” monad of Soul, but also to the so called “absolute” (ἀπόλυτοι) souls, which are partly hypercosmic and partly encosmic entities; (3) to analyze reasons that could cause Proclus to recognize the existence of souls above cosmos and to join Iamblichus’ interpretation of Timaeus’ psychogony against his master Syrianus’ view. In conclusion I’ll try to establish the genuine authorship of the doctrine of hypercosmic souls and to answer the question, why did Marinus attribute it to Proclus.

Harold Tarrant:
Proclus on the Soul’s Difficulties when First in the Body
The University of Newcastle (Australia)

The paper will examine Proclus’ tactics when tackling a passage of Plato’s Timaeus on which there had been little detailed discussion previously. In particular what are the forces that confront the soul, what happens to the circuits of Same and Other, and what the comparison with the upside-down man is supposed to achieve. Proclus’ desire to justify every word that Plato has chosen at 43a–44c (as elsewhere), has in this case resulted in a surprisingly literal reading of the passage, and when, at the very end of book 5, he appeals to the eikôs mythos status, it relates not to what he has just now been discussing, but rather to the following discussion that is introduced at 44c-d and will involve detailed discussion of bodily parts. There is no evidence that Proclus ever went on to comment on these matters.

Ilaria Ramelli:
Psychology and Soteriology in Origen and Porphyry
Catholic University Milan (Italy),
Angelicum University Princeton (USA)

I shall investigate the theory of the soul in the Christian Platonist Origen and its relation to contemporary “pagan” Platonic psychologies. In this connection, I shall explore his theory of ensomatism as distinct from metensomatosis and his notion of restoration of the soul as the necessary soteriological complement to the resurrection of the (spiritual) body. Restoration for Origen will be universal; this is a key feature of his eschatology and one that seems to have aroused the interest of Platonists such as Porphyry. The Tyrian, who is enjoying a welcome revival in scholarly interest, may have been a disciple of Origen in his youth, before studying with Plotinus.
I shall then investigate the possibility that universalistic soteriology in Porphyry (as recently characterized by Michael Simmons) may be considered a reaction to Origen’s Christianized Platonism. Simmons situates Porphyry within late antique debates about universal salvation, arguing that Christian universalism was the central theme of Porphyry’s work against the Christians and universal salvation was a core concern in his whole oeuvre, especially De regressu animae, Contra Christianos, and Philosophia ex oraculis (in this chronological order, against Bidez’ chronology). Simmons, however, takes “universal salvation” not as a synonym of apokatastasis, restoration and salvation as eventually achieved by all humans or rational creatures (what I will call “the strong sense”), but as salvation offered to all regardless of social class, gender, ethnicity etc., but not achieved by everyone (“the weak sense”). By this definition, the late Augustine and all patristic theologians were universalists— but not by the former definition, which fits Origen and the Origenians. I shall ask whether this also fits Porphyry.

I find it possible that Porphyry, influenced as he certainly was by Origen—the greatest ancient supporter of apokatastasis—and perhaps by Plotinus’ inclusive Platonopolis, was sensitized to the necessity of seeking a universal path of salvation. I agree with Simmons that Porphyry likely studied under Origen. Only, Origen supported universal salvation in the strong sense, while Simmons consistently reasons with the weak sense on his mind. A fragment from Porphyry’s Contra Christianos in Nemesius confirms my point: it nominally criticizes Christian ἀποκατάστασις as entailing resurrection taking place “only once, not periodically” (as Proclus later will theorize it— I devoted a separate treatment to this argument). Now, apokatastasis was Origen’s doctrine of universal salvation in the strong sense, which Porphyry knew well.

Laura Follesa:
Herder’s “Thinking in Images” in Children and the Platonic Reminiscence
University of Cagliari (Italy), Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena (Germany)

In the dialogue Über die Seelewanderung Drei Gespräche (On the Migration of the Soul. Three Dialogues, 1781), Johann Gottfried Herder discusses the problem of the “Platonic reminiscence”, that we find in some of Plato’s dialogues such as Meno and Phaedo. He interprets this idea in a definitely modern way: the reminiscence that seems to guide our knowledge does signal that our soul comes from an other world in a “previous life”; it derives from the experiences we had since we were children. As children, we mostly “think in images”: the imagination of a child is able to create a series of strong impressions, that continually return in the adult age and influence it. This is how Herder reads Plato’s theory of “reminiscence”: the “previous” world we lived in, is already in this life, and it is indeed the dreaming world in which every child lives. This new interpretation of Plato’s reminiscence plays a very important role in Herder’s work and in his theories on human psychology.
Karolina Kochanczyk-Boninska, Marta Przyszychowska, and Tomasz Stepień (organizers)

NATURE AND SUBSTANCE IN THE LATE ANTIQUITY

Tomasz Stepień: Eunomius and Gregory of Nyssa on the Activity of God and Plotinus’ Theory of Double Activity

Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski University in Warsaw (Poland)

The problem of how to understand God’s activity (energeia) is one of the key topics in the discussion between Neo-Arian Eunomius and Gregory of Nyssa. The activity of Divine Substance is so important because it is used by both sides of the conflict to describe generation of the Son of God. Eunomius claims that the essence of God is simple and unchangeable; therefore there could be only a single activity of the substance—generation of the Son of God. It is also the first act of creation, and thus the Son must have a completely different substance which is dissimilar with the substance of the Father. Gregory of Nyssa in his discussion strongly opposes such perception of generation. He gives various arguments which undermine Eunomius’ opinions claiming that generation is a unique activity which takes place inside the substance of God and therefore it is eternal, while the creative activity is not eternal and took place at a certain moment. Therefore, for Gregory there are two activities of God: internal (generation of the Son) and external (creation of the Universe).

Such claims are very similar to Plotinus’ theory of double activity, which he uses to describe the procession in noetic realm. For Plotinus the first stage of procession is also the internal activity, which is followed by the second external activity—the first phase of the constitution of lower hypostasis. Such similarities give rise to a question whether Gregory of Nyssa used and transformed Plotinus’ theory to explain generation of the Son of God in his polemic with Eunomius.

Marta Przyszychowska: Time of Creation of Human Nature according to Gregory of Nyssa

University of Warsaw (Poland)

The concept of human nature constitutes a basis for entire Gregory of Nyssa’s anthropology. He considered human nature to be an indivisible monad created by God in the first act of creation before He created the first human being—Adam. It is human nature as a unity that constitutes the image of God and that image has been perfect from the very beginning. Most scholars think that what God created in the first creation was only something planned, not real. I think that human nature was not just foreknown or planned, but it is a real creature created before (in temporal meaning) individuals. There are a few statements that suggest temporal and not only logical previousness of human nature and there is at least one text where Gregory straightforwardly admits it. It means that human nature—created before individuals—is transcendent to individual human beings. Such a concept of human nature is coherent with entire Gregory’s soteriology (in the Incarnation God’s Son took entire human nature) and eschatology. I am convinced it was the concept of transcendent human nature that allowed Gregory to speak simultaneously of apokatastasis understood as a return to the beginning and of eternal damnation of sinners.
Karolina Kochanczyk-Boninska:
Basil the Great’s Understanding of Substance in his Teaching about God’s Incomprehensibility
War Studies University in Warsaw (Poland)

In his famous polemic with Eunomius, Basil the Great presents his own, completely original concept of incomprehensibility of substance. He not only tries to convince his opponent that God’s substance is absolutely incomprehensible but argues that even the essence of created material beings cannot be known as the accidents cannot provide us any knowledge about the substance.

It may seem that as the problem of his understanding of substance was wildly discussed and different theories were presented there is no need to look at it again. But the understanding of substance in general is in strong relation with its cognoscibility which is the main subject of my interest. In this context I would like to look again at the problem how Basic understand substance and what are the main roots of his conception. In my paper I will base on three crucial sources: Contra Eunomium, Hexaemeron and Letters, which cannot be treated separately.
Mikhail Khorkov:
A Platonic Notion of Beauty in the
Interpretation of Nicholas of Cusa in the
Light of His Margins to Plato’s Dialogues and
Polemics with the Carthusians
IPH RAS, Moscow (Russian Federation),
MWK Erfurt (Germany)

In the mid-15th century debates on mystical theology between the German Carthusians and Nicholas of Cusa arises a question about the connection between wisdom and beauty. The Erfurt Carthusians Jacob de Paradiso and John de Indagine, who sharply criticized Platonism, believed that there can be no connection between wisdom and beauty, because beauty is completely associated with the sensual world, while the achievement of wisdom must be associated with the rejection of feelings for the sake of supersensible ecstatic affectivity of Divine Love.

A more moderate position was represented by Nicholas Kempf, an Austrian Carthusian monk from the Charterhouse Gaming. Following in his treatise On Mystical Theology (Tractatus de mystica theologia) Plotinus and Marius Victorinus, he added a hierarchy of ethical virtues to the ways of wisdom and beauty as the two main lines of ascent from the sensual world to the intelligible world. When the human mind is enlightened by the light of natural reason and is associated with the perfection of virtues, then its intellectual part becomes receptive to the beautiful divine light. Nicholas Kempf reaffirms his position with numerous references to the Platonic and Neo-Platonic philosophers. Of course, he is familiar with Augustine’s criticism of Platonism. But he still believes that the Christians must study philosophy, especially Neo-Platonic philosophy. As the most influential key authors on this subject, he mentions Plotin and Macrobius.

The position of Nicholas Kempf is particularly interesting in the sense that he finds his arguments in favor of recognition of an intellectual nature of wisdom and beauty not in the Aristotelian metaphysics, but in the Platonic and Neo-Platonic tradition. In his exposition on this subject he follows Plotinus and Marius

Victorinus, who describe the path to wisdom as an increase of virtues. Thus, the intellectual nature of wisdom is dependent on the ethical premises as well as on the inevitably ascetic form of the cultivation of the virtues.

I think that this is precisely the reason why Nicholas of Cusa does not follow the interpreting of the Plotinian ethics by Marius Victorinus (whose text he very well knows) in his own concept of wisdom and beauty. He did not agree either with the Erfurt Carthusians, nor with Nicholas Kempf. In contrast to them, he finds the arguments in support of his position, which is expressed mainly in his De Idiota dialogues, in Plato’s dialogue Phaedrus.

In his still unpublished marginal notes to the Latin translation of the Platonic dialogue Phaedrus in Codex Cusanus 177, Nicholas of Cusa drew his attention to Plato’s idea that “the sense of sight does not see the wisdom, although it is the sharpest of all senses”: “Visus enim in nobis acutissimus est sensuum omnium qui per corpus fiunt, quo sapientia non cernitur” (Phaidros 250 d, transl. into Latin by Leonardo Bruni; Bernkastel-Kues, St. Nikolaus Hospital, Hs. 177, f. 111r). Nicholas of Cusa wrote with his own hand in the margin to this text passage: “Visus acutissimus […] sapientia non cernitur” (Bernkastel-Kues, St. Nikolaus Hospital, Hs. 177, f. 111r).

As it is well known, Nicholas of Cusa argues in De sapientia that not only sense of sight, but also all senses are essentially spiritual (including the senses, which are strongly related to the flesh, e.g. the sense of taste, De sapientia n. 10, cf. n. 14, 4–10). In consequence, Cusanus notes that all what physical senses perceive is basically eternal wisdom. With all this, he uses the term sapientia, obviously following terminological choice of the translation by Leonardo Bruni, who translated the Greek word phronesis (“reasonableness”) into Latin as sapientia (“wisdom”). In the original text of Phaedrus (250 d) Plato actually describes a cognitive necessary connection of beauty and reason (phronesis). Consequently, the path to wisdom goes for Plato only through beauty that represents the

2 Ms. London, British Museum Library, Harleian 2652 from the library of Nicholas of Cusa contains the work of Marius Victorinus. In this manuscript, however, there are very few handwritten marginalia of Nicholas of Cusa.
perfection of the invisible divine wisdom in this world, although it is at the same time sensible. Then Plato describes in his dialogue progressive stages of an ascent from the world of senses to the world of eternal ideas, that is, to wisdom itself. But Leonardo Bruni removes from his translation these text passages on the gradual ascent of the human soul in the striving for beauty following the Olympic gods, presumably because of their pagan content. Thus Nicholas of Cusa could not be familiar with the entire Plato’s theory of ascent of the soul. As a result, he reduces it to the theory of a direct view of wisdom in all that human being perceives not only intellectually but also sensually. Compared to Plato, he concludes on the basis of the Latin translation by Leonardo Bruni, that it is not “reason”, but “eternal wisdom […] beauty in all what is beautiful” (De sapientia, n. 14, 5–6: Ipsa est pulchritudo in omni delectabili). However, at the same time, Nicholas of Cusa still understands wisdom as reason, which becomes according to him a meta-reason, as far as he interprets it as a principle of reason and spirit.

Oscar Federico Bauchwitz:
Cuando construir también es pensar:
arquitectura y anagogía en la iglesia de Saint Denys
Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte (Brazil)

Una iglesia es una cosa construida. Pensamos en la iglesia abacial de Saint Denys, considerada por los estudiosos del arte medieval como un prototipo a partir del cual la arquitectura gótica ha encontrado su primera definición para difundirse por toda Europa. En siglo XII, sufre reformas y transformaciones radicales bajo la dirección del obispo Suger. El espíritu que orienta esta renovación arquitectónica constituye una apertura original que ha inspirado la construcción de centenas de iglesias que dominarían el escenario europeo. Tal originalidad y fuente de inspiración no se dejan explicar por una simple innovación técnica en el arte de construir o edificar. Saint Denys es un ejemplo, en las palabras de Beierwaltes, “que una idea implicitamente filosófica y pronunciadamente teológica determina fundamentalmente la arquitectura en su configuración formal”. Su arquitecto y constructor, hizo con que su obra correspondiera a un pensamiento gestado a lo largo de siglos y que la historia de la filosofía denominó muy tardíamente de neoplatonismo. Es fundado en este pensamiento que Suger edifica su obra y da concreción y plasticidad a un concepto fundamental del pensamiento de Dionísio Areopagita y de su más significativo intérprete, Juan Escoto, el Eriugena: el sentido anagógico de la creación. Esta exposición procura explicitar de qué modo estos autores piensan la anagogía y cómo se refleja en la construcción del edificio.

When to Build is Also to Think:
Architecture and Anagogy in the Church of Saint Denys

A church is a thing built. We think about the abbey church of Saint Denys, considered by medieval art scholars as a prototype from which Gothic architecture has found its first definition to spread throughout Europe. In century XII, undergoes radical reforms and transformations under the direction of the bishop Suger. The spirit that guides this architectural renovation constitutes an original opening that has inspired the construction of hundreds of churches that would dominate the European scene. Such originality and source of inspiration are not allowed to be explained by a simple technical innovation in the art of building. Saint Denys is an example, in the words of Beierwaltes, “that an implicitly philosophical and pronounced theological idea fundamentally determines architecture in its formal configuration”. His architect and builder, made his work correspond to a thought developed over centuries and which the history of philosophy called very late Neoplatonism. It is based on this thought that Suger builds his work and gives concreteness and plasticity to a fundamental concept of the thought of Dionysius Areopagite and his most significant interpreter, John Scotus, the Eriugena: the anagogical sense of creation. This exhibition seeks to explain how these authors think of anagogy and how it is reflected in the construction of the building.
Hyun Höchsmann:
Porphyry’s “On the Cave of the Nymphs”
East China Normal University, Shanghai (China)

“What does Homer signify by the cave?” In search of the significance of the cave of the nymphs in the thirteenth book of the *Odyssey*, surveying the commentaries on the Homeric text, Porphyry puts forward an important epistemological point:

[W]hether the poet describes it as it really is, or whether he has added something to it of his own invention... the same enquiries remain.

If the aim in reading a text, whether poetry or history, is to understand its meaning, then the same methods of syntactic and semantic analysis for the truth conditions and truth claims apply.

The landscape of the cave In Porphyry’s reflections on the passage from the *Odyssey* the cave is an allegorical representation of the phenomenal world of becoming and generation of the soul. Situated between two gates, one for the gods and one for the mortals, the cave is a temporary abode of the embodied souls, a place for the souls to pass through—a place of transience. Porphyry enlists the evidence from comprehensive geographical and historical studies to put forward the view that Homer inherited the tradition of veneration of caves and that the cave is not an invention of Homer but a sacred place since antiquity. Porphyry sets his interpretation of Homer’s cave in a historical framework and not in a distant and mythical or epic narration. Depicting what goes on within, above and beyond the cave, Porphyry emphasises the rationality of the Homeric poetic representations.

**Nymphs, souls and bees** Water is the predominant element in the cave. Within the cave the nymphs of running water, naiads, are weaving the garments for the embodied souls. Since Porphyry characterises the nymphs also as souls, it is plausible to infer that when the soul descends taking up a bodily form, in weaving their own garments the souls determine their external appearances. Embodied souls are also identified with bees who deposit honey in the cave.

**Light and Darkness** Porphyry describes the luminous and alluring imagery of the surroundings of the cave. But relating it to Plato’s allegory of the cave, Porphyry emphasises that when we behold it with the eyes of the intellect, it is a pace of shadows and flickering reflections in darkness for its foundations are obscure and dark.

**Philosophical significance of Porphyry’s allegorical interpretation** Building on the tradition of Homeric commentaries, Porphyry’s interpretation of the cave as an allegory of the soul’s descent into a bodily form provides a launching point of resolving the ancient quarrel between poetry and philosophy. Together with Porphyry’s extant writings on Homer (*Homeric Questions* and *On the Styx*), *On the Cave of Nymphs* links Homer’s poetry with philosophical enquiry into the journey of the soul beyond the cave and the river of forgetfulness. Porphyry’s reflections on the cave present a response to Plato’s readiness to welcome Homer and the poets to the kallipolis (*Republic* 10.607d–e) and invitation to demonstrate the wisdom and moral efficacy of Homeric poetry. Porphyry integrates astronomy, Pythagorean metaphysics, Heraclitus’ two kinds of souls (dry and wet), Plato’s allegory of the cave and Numenius’ thesis that the *Odyssey* is an allegory of the soul’s return to its true self. Porphyry’s expansive interpretative analysis of the passage illustrates the convergence of philosophical enquiry and allegorical truth in epic poetry.
John F. Finamore:
Iamblichus, Simplicius, and Priscianus on the Divided Soul
University of Iowa (USA)

In this paper I will discuss Iamblichus’ doctrine of the rational soul, its double nature, and its association with and separation from the Intellect. The investigation will lead to a related inquiry into the role of theurgy in human life, particularly the soul’s re-ascent to Intellect and how Iamblichus framed his doctrine of the soul in line with his belief in the theurgic ascent.

In his De Anima, Iamblichus lays out his doctrine that the soul is a mean between Intellect and Nature. Simplicius in his commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima and Priscianus in his Metaphrasis in Theophrastum shed further light on the nature of the rational soul in Iamblichus’ philosophy. According to these two authors, the soul in Iamblichean theory changes in its very essence; it lives two lives, Intelligible and material, but is always in the process of changing from one extreme to another. Its essence is alterity.

After discussing some preliminary material from Iamblichus’s De Anima, I will explore passages from Simplicius and Priscianus, especially Simplicius 89.33–90.25 and 240.33–241.26 and Priscianus 26.14–26.29, to show how Iamblichus conceives the soul to be in need of the Divine Intellect for its intellection, and how that need and its own intermediary nature cause the soul to slacken, weaken, and descend even as it is engaged in intellection above. Conversely, it also allows the soul to strive for ascent to the Intellect when it is engaged in its existence in the realm of Nature. Finally, given the dual nature of the soul, it becomes apparent how theurgy through divine illumination is necessary for the soul’s ascent.

John D. Turner:
New Light on Third Century Metaphysical Triads and the Legacy of A.J. “Zeke” Mazur
University of Nebraska, Lincoln (USA)

Of recent scholarship on the ontological and ontogenetic metaphysics of Platonist, Christian, and “Gnostic” thinkers of the Imperial Age that has appeared in the last decade, much of it has been provoked by the similarities between the various triadic structures appearing in several Platonizing “gnostic” treatises emanating from Valentinian and Sethian authors and those developed in more “academic” sources such as certain Middleplatonic authors, the writings of Plotinus, and other Neoplatonic thinkers. This essay will survey some of these similarities as well as proposals concerning the origins of these triadic structures—such as the notorious being-life-mind noetic triad—and the possible identity of the thinkers behind them. One of the most productive scholars in this enterprise, Zeke Mazur, is no longer among us, and so part of this essay will attempt to call attention to some of his recent insights on this subject that he has expressed both in private communication and in some of his as-yet-to-be-published papers, whose early appearance in print a number of us are attempting to facilitate.
In my presentation I would like to show that *quattrocento* abounded in treatises about immortality of the soul, in which Platonist concepts played one of the major roles.

Immortality of the soul has been one of the most important and most widely discussed questions since the beginning of the development of European philosophy. In the Christian world, the history of answers to it can be divided—on a higher level of generality—into concepts that refer to Platonism and neo-Platonism and solutions in the spirit of the Aristotelian philosophy, including the often criticised interpretation of Averroes. The problem, not completely solved in deliberations of early Christian philosophers or in detailed analyses of scholastic thinkers, gained a new impetus in the new Renaissance theological and philosophical context.

The intensification of the question concerning individual immortality is observed especially in the second half of the XIII century when took place a famous polemics between, among others, Saint Thomas, Giles of Rome and Siger of Brabant, but in *quattrocento* this problem returned, although this new phase of the issue had a new dimension and it was connected to the growing interest in Platonism. Indeed, in the fifteenth century, a relatively large number of treatises were written strictly about immortality. Amongst the authors we can name (of course, it is not a complete list): Johannes Ferrarensis, Antonio degli Agli, Leonardo Nogarola, Agostino Dati, Jacopo Campora, Pier Candido Decembrio and Marsilio Ficino with his most significant work on the topic during century: *Theologia Platonica*. As it is well known, in his famous treatise, Ficino largely used Platonic and Neoplatonic considerations for proving immortality of the individual soul and he was the first philosopher in the Latin West who translated the *Corpus Platonicum*, as well as *Enneads* and several other Neoplatonic works. However, the aforementioned intellectuals also used some Platonic arguments in their treatises, even if they composed them before Ficino’s translations and they knew Platonism mainly from indirect sources. It does not mean that these texts have entirely Platonic character, in fact one can find many references to other philosophical traditions in them (as humanists did understand the power of the debates about Averroes’ doctrine of the unity of the intellect), but the Platonism was one of the sources of their defense of the immortality. To give some examples, it can be mentioned that Ferrarensis referred to Plato’s *Phaedo* and various Platonic concepts, Dati dedicated a book of his work to thought of Plato and Socrates and he also stressed Lactantius’ considerations on the soul, degli Agli in the Neoplatonic concept of the divine light saw the source of intellectual part of the soul, etc.
1985, thereby initiating contemporary analysis of the rich field of disputation on questions connected to the divine ideas available in Czech manuscripts. These disputations attracted many young Czech theologians who would later figure importantly in the Hussite movement, from Jan Hus and Jerome of Prague, to Jakoubek Stríbro, and other, lesser known figures. The one work that can rightly be compared to Wyclif’s own, though, is the *Commentary on De Universalibus* of Stanislaus of Znojmo, which contains a masterful overview of the doctrine as Wyclif presented it in his *De Ideis*. The latter treatise is finally to be published by the British Academy, and my access to this treatise has allowed me to survey it in light of the commentary of Stanislaus. In this paper I will discuss the relation of the two treatments of the doctrine, with particular attention to the question of what each perceived to be the range of intentional objects of these eternal ideas. Does God have ideas of actuals, or also of counterfactuals and impossibles? Is there a necessitating power holding between the idea and its object so that contingency is illusory? These two questions in particular became points of contention with the growth of Bohemian interest in Wyclif’s apparently deterministic ecclesiology, which led to Hus’s *De Ecclesia*, a critical text in the history of the Hussite movement. I will include contemporary Czech scholarship in my discussion.

**Steffen Huber:**
Traces of Neoplatonism in Polish Renaissance Thought: the Case of Stanisław Orzechowski (1513–1566)
Jagiellonian University, Cracow (Poland)

During the first 200 years of history of philosophy in Poland, explicit (Neo-)Platonism appeared as a rather exotic option. Scholastic thinkers like Benedict Hesse viewed it as a radical realism in the quarrel over universals and, as such, closely related to the politically problematic ontological realism put forward by the Husites. Another obstacle to the reception of Western Platonism was the clearly practical orientation of Polish philosophy, its lack of interest in systematic speculation and its distrust of radical preconceptual intuition. The predominantly aristotelian terminology used in Poland before 1520 favoured moderate nominalism and moderate realism both in the theoretical and practical dimension. The same can be said about the humanist ciceronianism after 1520.

However, from the late 15th century onwards this Antiplatonic attitude was counteracted by cryptic references through Albertism and Scotism, and religious debates provoked spontaneous metaphysical quarrels. In this context (Neo-)Platonic intuitions transported by Stoic and/or Christian motifs have played a major role. Adam of Łowicz (1486–1514) discussed the wandering of souls at the background of Neoplatonic metaphysics. George Libanus (1464–1546) connected the aim of rediscovering Platonic thought with that of a better understanding of the Egyptian motifs in the Old Testament. This approach can be found in central documents of Polish Renaissance thought, eg. in Frycz Modrzewski’s theory of the state where Moses appeared as a teacher of universal wisdom and political unity.

An especially interesting case of importing Neoplatonic intuitions to Polish philosophy is that of Stanisław Orzechowski. Although verbally claiming to be an Aristotelian, Orzechowski created a clearly Neoplatonic metaphysics. His key experience is that of the absolute One as the source of all unity whatsoever in the physical world. In my paper I will argue that possibly this strategy was rooted in Orzechowski’s identity as *Roxolanus*, i.e. representative of the Ruthenic and Orthodoxe nobility. If so, his Neoplatonism might have been related even to the reception of Byzantine thought during the Kievan Rus. This preliminary hypothesis leads to another one: perhaps the reception of Western (Neo-)Platonism in Poland was obstructed not only by competing Western philosophical traditions but also by a competing Neoplatonism which was hidden in cultural patterns of the Slavic East and yet searched for its philosophical expression. Both hypotheses correspond with the fact that Eastern (Neo-)Platonism invigorated rapidly after 1600 as the philosophical, theological and political discourse switched from Latin to Polish and other languages used in the Polish Commonwealth.
Mathilde Cambron-Goulet: 
Gender Construction and Social Connections in Porphyry’s “Ad Marcellam”
*Université du Québec à Montréal (Canada)*

Porphyry tells us that there were women among Plotinus’ auditors (*Life of Plotinus* 9) and also mentions he gave lessons to his wife Marcella (*Marc.* 10). Is Porphyry’s wife Marcella considered a legitimate philosopher? The ability of women to practice philosophy is also an important theme of the letter as Porphyry’s addressee is a woman and the piece was probably intended for publication, hence Whittaker (2010: 49) considers the piece a protreptic to convert women to philosophy. This ability is questioned at the time (Lactantius, *Inst. Div.* 3, 25): as women are trained for domestic work rather than letters or rhetoric, how could they develop it?

Besides, many women philosophers are characterized by their familial connection with more widely accepted philosophers: that is notably the case of the pythagorician women philosophers (Waithe 1987: 11). Amphicleia, who is mentioned in *Life of Plotinus* 9, is Jamblichus’ daughter-in-law. The *Ad Marcellam* presents a particular interest when it comes to the relationship between philosophical networks and family networks, as it has been considered and apology for Porphyry’s marriage with Marcella (Guillaumont 2017: 302). Marcella’s belonging to Porphyry’s family is then one of the characteristics that would allow her to be identified as a philosopher. The display of her social connections with the philosopher through epistolarity also contributes to this construction of her identity as a legitimate member of the Neoplatonic circle (Van Hoof and Van Nuffelen 2015, William 2014).

But although the familial connection play a central role in the identification of women philosophers, the argumentation that is developed by Porphyry in his apology of the marriage constructs Marcella as a rather masculine character and as a philosopher-to-be herself (*Marc.* 1–3). The exhortations that are found elsewhere in the letter also suggest her to behave in a more virile (ἀρρην) way (*Marc.* 33). Women who practice philosophy do not conform to the gendered expectations of their social role (Blundell 1995: 161), although their philosophical activity is often exerted within the familial cell and covers practical day-to-day life (Waithe 1987). This should not lead us to think that feminine philosophical activity was necessarily considered illegitimate, as the practical dimension of philosophy is attested in Neoplatonism (Hadot 1995: 243–259).

This paper aims to clarify the characteristics of women that were included in philosophical circles, by examining their place within social and familial networks and the gender construction that is recommended for them in Neoplatonic texts, focusing on the case study of Marcella.

**References:**


Krzysztof Łapiński:
Philosophical Education of Women in Musonius Rufus’ Diatribes and Porphyry’s “Letter to Marcella”
University of Warsaw, (Poland)

According to the Stoics, women and men share the same logos and are equal in respect of virtue. Although such opinions are to be found as early as in the Old Stoa (cf. Cleanthes), the evidence is very scarce. More detailed account of this question survives in a few diatribes by Roman philosopher, Musonius Rufus (ed. O. Hense), who encourages his male audience to allow women to study philosophy. Musonius justifies his exhortations with his own version of the Platonic concept of four cardinal virtues. He attempts to show that philosophy is indispensable, both for women as well as for men, to develop the same set of virtues. Musonius pays special attention to the therapeutic dimension of philosophy. However, the ultimate goal of human life is the assimilation to god, who, according to Musonius, can be understood as the possessor of the cardinal virtues. Therefore, philosophy, which starts from its therapeutical arguments, leads both women and men to adjusting to god. In Porphyry’s Letter to Marcella, philosophy performs similar function. Philosophy is conceived as the proper way of life for both women and men: the therapy of soul and the way of adjusting to god. Like Musonius, Porphyry focuses on the similarities between women and men in order to point out what is essential for human beings. For Porphyry, women and men are equal in respect of their souls, and philosophy should assist in liberating human soul from its bodily constraints. Both authors assign comparable role to philosophy, which can be interpreted from the perspective of Pierre Hadot’s paradigm of “spiritual exercises”. However, the context of women’s philosophical education, providing additional aspects on this issue, allows to draw out more universal dimension of this paradigm.

Jana Schultz:
Maternal Causes in Proclus Metaphysics
Ruhr-Universität Bochum (Germany)

The examination of the female principles in Proclus’ metaphysics contributes not only to the understanding of his complex metaphysical system, but his evaluation of the role of metaphysical female principles has also direct impact on his attitude towards women in general, since for him our physical world is an image of the higher intelligible reality. This paper analyzes the nature and function of a certain kind of female principle in his metaphysics, namely the maternal causes or deities. Thereby, this paper will first (i) discuss the notion of the maternal causes as perfecting or actualizing causes which is a main thesis of Neoplatonic embryology, (ii) analyze the main properties Proclus ascribes to maternal causes in the metaphysical realm and (iii) argue that the specific function of the maternal causes in Proclus is to incite (προκαλουμένη) the paternal powers to procession.

In the procreation within the physical realm, the maternal causes fulfill a perfecting function. The male semen only potentially contains the form principles of the offspring. They get actualized by the nature of the mother. The mother is the cause that perfects the offspring and leads it to reversion (in Parm. 792, 7–15). But the maternal causes are distinct from the paternal causes by this function only within the special circumstances of physical procreation. Here, the father is separated from the offspring after the disposal of the semen. Therefore the mother’s nature is the only instance left which has actualized form principles and can fulfill the function of actualization. In the metaphysical realm, in contrast, the paternal and maternal causes both remain connected with the offspring.
The function of perfecting the offspring belongs there to both causes equally (in *Tim. II* 222, 27–9) and therefore doesn’t distinguish the maternal causes.

Rather, the maternal causes in the metaphysical realm are determined by Proclus through five main properties. They are (1) dyadic (in *Parm.* 662, 4–9), (2) a manifestation of the first infinity (*Theol. Plat.* I 122, 5–10), (3) associated with procession and life (in *Tim. I* 220, 5–10), (4) generative or fertile powers (*Theol. Plat.* V 44, 12, *In Remp.* I 134, 12–7) and (5) intermediate terms within triadic structures (in *Crat.* 143, 11–5). To be sure, even these properties don’t belong to the maternal causes exclusively. Instead, the paternal causes—which are mainly unifying causes dominated by limit and permanence—have a share in these properties. For instance, Cronus is described as having generative powers (*Theol. Plat.* V 36, 13) and as being a cause of procession and separation (in *Crat.* 63, 16–20). Nonetheless, the maternal causes are distinct from the paternal causes according to the above mentioned properties—not by having them exclusively, but by being mixtures of more basic principles (esp. Limit and Infinity) in which these properties strongly dominate (*Theol. Plat.* IV 91, 21–26).

These maternal causes have the function to communicate the procession of the offspring from the father and its reversion to the father. The metaphysical mother is described as a kind of womb which receives the powers descending from the father (*Theol. Plat.* V 76, 1). But the maternal causes are not a merely passive principles. Instead, the maternal causes are active with regard to the descending powers of the father. For because the paternal powers are distinguished by a high level of steadiness and permanence (τὰς μενούσας αἰτίας, *Theol. Plat.* V 36, 14–5), it is the function of the maternal causes to incite (προκαλουμένην, *Theol. Plat.* V 36, 14–5, *In Tim. III* 188, 22–3) these powers to proceed to lower levels of reality.

Altogether, the maternal causes in Proclus’ metaphysics are active, generative principles which are associated with infinity, procession and life. Due to having an intermediate position within the triadic structures of Proclus’ system, they communicate both the procession and reversion of the offspring. But whereas they fulfill the function of perfecting the offspring together with the father, they are distinguished from the paternal causes by their ability to incite the procession of the powers which are contained as steady and permanent in the father.

References—Primary Literature:

References—Secondary Literature:


Marilena Vlad (organizer)

**SELF-CONSTITUTION AND SELF-KNOWLEDGE IN THE NEOPLATONIC TRADITION**

Andrei Timotin:

*Institute for Philosophy “Al. Dragomir”, Bucharest (Romania)*

The problem of the causality of intelligible realities is examined by Plotinus in *Enn. V 4* [7] in the frame of the question of how and why the First Principle produces Intellect. In this context, Plotinus attributes the intelligible realities an eidetic causality (opposed to the efficient causality), which is characterized by permanence and immutability. The fundamental problem that Plotinus needs to solve is to show that, in spite of the fact that the One always remains in itself, something could derive or emanate from it. The most part of *Enn. V 4* is devoted to this aporia. In this context, Plotinus elaborates the theory according to which the intelligible realities perform two kinds of acts, an act which is identical with their own nature, and another one which produces something other than themselves.
The present paper intends to analyse Plotinus’ approach and, in particular, the role the theory of two acts plays in it and his dialogue with Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*. Other Plotinian texts will also be questioned in this context: *Enn.* VI 9 [9] 3–4, V 1 [10] 6, II 5 [25] 1–3, III 8 [30] 3–4, and VI 7 [38], 15–27.

Daniela Elena Tarbă:
Self-Constitution of the One in Plotinus’ View
*Institute for Philosophy “Al. Dragomir”, Bucharest (Romania)*

In the Plotinian philosophy self-constitution is strictly a matter regarding the One. The One can by no means become an object of knowledge. When we say that the One is the first principle and the source of everything, as it also is the end of all aspirations, the supreme object of desire, we do not really say what it is. We rather try to say what it is not in comparison to the objects of consciousness, and as a negation of the multiple. We cannot talk about the One *per se*, but rather refer to it from the perspective of the universal role it must play in the structure of reality. Hence, when talking about the One, we cannot search for any cause or source. This would imply the existence of another principle, prior to the absolute principle.

In this paper, I attempt to solve what seems to be a contradiction regarding self-constitution. In *Enneads* VI 8, 10.21 Plotinus claims that there can be no self-constitution of the One. He does so by highlighting the difficulty of talking about that which is not born (γίγνομαι—μὴ ἐγένετ), showing that in terms of necessity, the One is the cause of everything that came into being. However, it is not itself conditioned by necessity, hence it cannot be said that the One gave itself substance or that it had caused itself to come into being (ὑφίστημι—οὐχ ὑποστήσας ἑαυτόν", ἢ οὐδέ ὑπέστη, *Ennead* VI 8, 10.23, 34–35). On the other hand, in *Ennead* VI 8,10.54, Plotinus postulates the self-constitution of the One (οὐτως ὑποστήσας ἂν εἰπων αὑτὸν). He shows that if its will or purpose (βούλησις) comes from within, as its own act, then the One, by its own will and not by accident, must be self-constituted. My aim is to show that this is only an apparent contradiction, due to the difficulty of trying to comprehend the nature of the One within the limits of discursive thought and that, when actually referring to self-constitution, we can only ascribe it to the first principle in order to show that it can have no other cause than itself.

Gheorghe Pașcalău:
Time as a Self-Conststituted Intellect in the Philosophy of Proclus
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Criticizing both Aristotle’s definition of time as “number of motion” and Plotinus’ vision of it as “life of the soul”, and in the same time opening himself to impulses received from the philosophy of Iamblichus, Proclus understands time as a “substance” (*ousia*) and as an “intellect” (*nous*, in Tim. III 25, 11–16). Time is for him that which “perfections the soul” and thus necessarily transcends the psychic level of reality. But if time is an intellect, given that self-constitution is an essential characteristic of any intellect, one can reasonably ask in what way time might be understood as a self-constituted being. My paper will discuss the intellectual and self-constituted nature of time and the problems concerning this challenging view of it. I will try to argue that self-constitution is implied in the fact that time is its own measure. This is true not only for the Idea of time, which in itself is “absolute number” (*autoarithmos*), but also for each part of time, as each astral god applies to himself an own measure.
In perusing the Timaeus, one meets more than a few lines where one or another philosophical theory is contingent upon some philological choice. Hence the text at Timaeus 27c 5, where the phrase η γέγονεν η και ἀγενές ἐστιν can be understood in more than one sense, with each one having a potentially substantial effect upon our analysis of the cosmogony. Arguably, it would be best to follow after Whittaker, who opines that the first η stands for εἰ (“if”) and not ᾗ (“how”, if not “whether”), as Burnet and Rivaud thought. For if one understands the second η in the phrase η γέγονεν η και ἀγενές ἐστιν to be disjunctive (that is, ἢ καὶ), one finds that ᾗ γέγονεν ἢ καὶ ἀγενές ἐστιν, the reading proffered by Burnet and Rivaud, is attested neither in the extant manuscripts (not even the earliest of them, Parisinus graecus 1807 (MS A), where the first η is represented by ηι, with a punctual notation over the ι, showing that it was “hesitatingly corrected to η”) nor in the ancient commentaries on the Timaeus, whilst the reading εἰ γέγονεν η και ἀγενές ἐστιν is attested in those commentaries. Nevertheless, one may contend that the second η is not disjunctive but concessive, so that one ought to read not η καὶ (“or even”) but εἰ καὶ (“if indeed”), which certainly appears to give far greater weight to a metaphorical exegesis of the cosmogony. So too, some exegetes even emend the customary ἀγενές (“ungenerated”) to ἀειγενές (“always generated”), with similar results.2 Still, whilst exegetes acknowledge that the second η may be either disjunctive or concessive, many would object to the reading of ἀειγενές on the ground that cosmogenesis is said to have had “some beginning” at 28b2–c2. However, reading ἀειγενές at 27c 5 is not really as strange as exegetes may assume, at least if one carefully considers the programmatic function of this passage. My aim in this paper is to show, by recourse to the principle of creatio perpetua, that the reading of ἀειγενές at 27c 5 allows for a cogent exegesis of the cosmogony, and this regardless of whether or not cosmogenesis is construed metaphorically.

Michèle Anik Stanbury:
Alexander of Aphrodisias and Aristotle’s “Metaphysics” in Plotinus’ “Ennead” V, 9
Mount Allison University (Canada)

Plotinus was not terribly careful about the exactness of his quotations. This can partially be explained as an effect of his increasing blindness during the period of life in which he was writing. However, there is evidence to suggest that Plotinus was unconcerned with—and perhaps even disdainful of—an over-exactitude in such matters as precision of language and textual reference. The *Enneads* are peppered with comments about the need to value truth over niceness of speech.3 This inexactitude on Plotinus’ part often causes difficulties in establishing the influence of previous philosophers on his writing. We have from Porphyry a list of philosophers who were read by Plotinus in his classroom, but at what point and to what extent those readings influenced his thought positively or negatively is a matter of some debate.

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1 A particularly relevant example is found in *Ennead* III.7.10.
In the case of Alexander of Aphrodisias in particular scholars have vigorously debated the evidence of influence upon Plotinus. In the 1960s there was a flurry of writings by scholars such as Hager and Armstrong, claiming that certain passage showed clear verbal parallels between Alexander and Plotinus. Rist responded with a devastating rebuttal, showing all claims of exact textual reference to be imprecise and inconclusive. Rist’s argument made clear that any demonstration of Alexander’s influence would have to proceed differently.

In this essay, I intend to demonstrate how one can identify some of the more obscure influences and references in Plotinus’s writings by focusing on Ennead V.9: On Intellect, the Forms, and Being. The text begins: “Πάντες ἄνθρωποι ἐξ ἀρχῆς γενόμενοι ἀισθήσει πρὸ νοῦ χρησάμενοι καὶ τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς προσβαλόντες πρώτοι ἐξ ἀνάγκης.” No student of Aristotle’s Metaphysics can fail to notice a similarity with that work’s opening line. And yet only the first two words are precisely the same. Is this a reference at all, then, or simply a literary coincidence?

To overcome any doubts about the connection between Ennead V.9 and Aristotle’s Metaphysics, two factors need to be considered. The first is the effect of Plotinus’ somewhat distant memory of the text of the Metaphysics: V.9 roughly follows the same series of subjects as Aristotle’s work, but in a very condensed and somewhat free-form manner. The similarity is, however, evident. The second factor is the influence of Alexander’s Metaphysics commentary, a work likely read alongside Aristotle’s Metaphysics in Plotinus’ classroom. The opening passage of V.9 can only be seen as referring to the Metaphysics after examining Alexander’s commentary on that work. Without the aid of Alexander, Plotinus discussion appears unrelated to the Metaphysics.

Matteo Milesi:
Porphyry on Homeric Exegesis: A Reassessment of the So-Called “Letter to Anatolius”
University of Michigan (USA)

The aim of this paper is to show the systematic nature of Porphyry’s interpretation of the Homeric poems and to challenge the traditional separation between Porphyry’s philological and allegorical treatises. I will proceed to a close reading of an important programmatic text that has been considered in the past as a manifesto of Porphyry’s anti-allegorical position, namely the so-called Letter to Anatolius that prefaces the Homeric Questions.

In the letter, Porphyry sketches a hermeneutical method that proceeds through three steps. First, it is necessary to understand the general message of the text. The verb that Porphyry employs to define this most elementary process is περινοεῖν, which in the middle and neo-Platonic tradition refers to a cognitive process that concerns a totality of elements and that aims to pinpoint a property that underlies the members of a group (cf. Hermes IX.10; Iambl. In Ni. Arit. 121.20 Klein; Orig. CMat. XIV.6–9).

Next, it is necessary to understand the meaning of the poet’s words. Porphyry uses the verb νοεῖν to indicate this process. This verb, within the Porphyrian epistemological framework, refers to a cognitive activity that does not bring any real new knowledge to the subject, but it is a form of immediate self-disclosure.


6 We are sadly hindered in this, unfortunately, since the commentaries of Aspasius and Adrastus are not-extant.
and self-cognition (Porphyry, *Aph. Aphi.* 16.1–3; 43; 44). Hence, the Homeric diction should be understood without importing any external knowledge during the exegetical activity, but by following the principle according to which “Homer interprets himself”.

Then, after having clarified the general and literary meaning of the poems, the interpreter should carry out a research (σκέψις) in order to pinpoint what the poet hid in the text concerning metaphysical truths. It is at this point that allegory plays an important role, as emerges from the fragmentary opening of Porphyry’s treatise *On the Styx* (fr. 372 Smith). Keeping an adequate chronological distance, one may dare to say that Porphyry is “philological” in his way of conceiving Homeric hermeneutics also when he performs allegory: ideally, the focus is on the will of the author of the text on which he is commenting on, and the aim is to clarify the text itself in an objective way, without judging its the level of truth.

The present paper intends to study the Trinity that Ralph Cudworth (1617–1688) introduces in Chapter 4 of his *True Intellectual System of the Universe*. There the author examines the diverse conceptions of God that can be found throughout history; and, in paragraph XXXVI, he focuses on Arianism with the intention of proving that Ario and his followers are not Platonists at all, in opposition to what Denis Péteau (1583–1652) has affirmed. For that reason, Cudworth presents the Platonic Trinity as very close to Christianity. Through this path the English author deals with several sources, which include not only Plato but also other later Platonists, such as Plotinus, Porphyry, Proclus, Iamblichus, and Simplicius; and although he quotes them through his text, he also criticizes them in some respects, which leaves the author in an odd position giving place to much criticism toward his argumentation. He also sets different kinds of Platonism and, for that reason, Amelius, Moderatus, and Numenius are presented as another branch,
different from that of the later Platonists, and indeed he points out some difference between those as well.

One main theme is that Cudworth sustains that the divine Trinity has its origin in Egypt and that it has had different interpretations throughout history, but the important thing for this Cambridge Platonist is that it is a product of mere human wit and reason. A source that Cudworth uses in order to present the mosaic Trinity in this section is Eusebius of Caesarea’s *Praeparatio Evangelica*. This time I want to compare Cudworth’s argumentation with Books VII and XI of the *Praeparatio* in order to find some resemblance. I will also compare the different pieces of secondary bibliography on this theme and I will present some conclusions.

**Derek Michaud:**
**John Smith’s Plotinian Rational Theology**
*University of Maine (USA)*

This paper explores John Smith’s appropriation of Plotinus in the service of rational theology. The posthumously published *Select Discourses* (1660) draw heavily on Plotinian arguments. First, Smith’s treatment of several classic loci in philosophical theology rely on his reading, and interpretation, of Plotinus. In the Neoplatonist Smith finds that the experiential and methodological foundations of rational theology lie in intellectual intuition. Moreover, Smith’s arguments for the immortality of the soul and the existence of God stem largely from the Platonic tradition including, above all, Plotinus as an authoritative interpreter thereof. In particular, Smith picks up on, and amplifies, the transcendent aspects of Plotinus’s thought, yielding a hierarchical ontology valuing the spiritual over the material. Smith’s agenda is to counter Renaissance and early Modern forms of materialism under the guise of Epicureanism. Second, Smith’s development of these tendencies in Plotinus enables him to embrace, rather uncritically, the new philosophy of Descartes. For Smith, Cartesian dualism is one of the latest formulations of the ancient theology that allows for both modern scientific inquiry in the material realm and traditional religion in the spiritual domain. Third, in addition to these systematic uses of Plotinian philosophy, Smith understands “true religion” as a “spiritual practice” on the strength of arguments from Plotinus and Christian Platonism.

**Douglas Hedley:**
**Ralph Cudworth and Ancient Theology**
*University of Cambridge (United Kingdom)*

Some recent scholarship has cast doubt upon the usefulness of the term “Cambridge Platonism”. I claim that even in his ancient theology Cudworth is motivated by philosophical considerations, and that his legacy among philosophers in the 18th and 19th centuries should not be overlooked. In order to explain these interests and influences, however, “Platonism” is unavoidable. Furthermore, the Cambridge context of this Platonism is decisive.
Lloyd P. Gerson:
Why Intelligible are not External to the Intellect
University of Toronto (Canada)

In *Ennead V 5* [32], Plotinus defends the claim—clearly controversial at the time, as Porphyry notes—that intelligibles are not external to or outside the intellect. The provenance of this claim is primarily Plato’s *Sophist* and *Timaeus* and Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* and *De anima*. Nevertheless, the philosophical force of the argument for this claim has not been well understood. In particular, the assertion that unless intelligibles are internal to intellect it cannot “possess their truth” seems entirely question-begging. In this paper, I will try to show Plotinus’ reasons for holding that unless intelligibles are internal to intellect, there could not be necessary truths, e.g., crimson is darker than pink or $3 + 4 = 7$ or if $A$ is greater than $B$, and $B$ is greater than $C$, then $A$ is greater than $C$. And if there can be no necessary truths, then there can be no contingent truths either. So, the postulation of intellect, cognitively identical with all intelligibles, is a central doctrine of Platonism. Some desultory attempts to prise eternal intellect from eternal intelligibles, e.g., in contemporary mathematical Platonism, must inevitably fail.
*hexis* which rest on an original post-Aristotelian development of the Aristotelian themes. The former will serve me to establish the fundamental interpretation of the vague portions of *De Anima*. The latter inscribes the concept of a state or condition as a genre of quality in a logical scheme of paronymical predication. This in turn will allow me to comment on further changes brought by the commentaries of Themistius and Simplicius—the former being one of the main sources for Averroes in his *Long Commentary*, and the latter for Aquinas. My goal will not consist in providing a complete and final answers to the problem at hand, but rather—in the limited time I will be bestowed—in defining the frame of investigation in the neglected, non-ethical history of *hexis/habitus* and presenting the current state of research.

Secondary literature (excerpt):


Eugene Afonasin:

*Neoplatonic Asclepius between Science and Religion*

*Novosibirsk State University (Russian Federation)*

In the first part of the paper, I will briefly discuss certain peculiarities of the medical profession in antiquity. In his *Philosophical History* (fr. 80–84 Athanassiadi) Damascius narrates about a philosopher, named Asclepiodotus, whose interests ranged from Platonic philosophy to Aristotelian natural sciences. Asclepiodotus’ instructor in medical matters, a son of a doctor from the island of Rhodes, Iacobus, is pictured by Damascius as an exemplary figure (fr. 84), who, unlike many of his contemporaries, did not solely rely in his practice on compilations and anthologies, having unceasingly tried to acquire first-hand medical experience. He always tested the opinions of others and gained a reputation of an extremely successful physician, although the methods of treatment, ascribed to him by Damascius, are highly reminiscent of those presented as the Pythagorean by Iamblichus (*On the Pythagorean way of life* 244). In this respect both Iacobus and Asclepiodotus are conformed to the best standards of medical ethics, and pass the test set by Galen in his “On examination by which the best physicians are recognized”, except perhaps by the fact that they preferred to base their activities on such authorities as Aristotle and the Methodist Soranus rather than on a list of the “dogmatists” proposed by Galen.

In the second part of the paper, dedicated to the cult of Asclepius in Late Antiquity, we will look at various kinds of evidence taken from the Neoplatonic philosophers. The greatest of them, Proclus, had intimate relations with many gods, but Asclepius seems to assist him all his life: the young Proclus miraculously recovered when the son of Asclepius, Telesphorus, appeared to him in a dream; in a more advanced age the patron of medicine saved him again, this time from arthritis; and it was Asclepius who appeared to him as a serpent “in his final illness” (*Vita Procli* 7 and 31). The philosopher speaks about a vision of Asclepius in his *Commentary to Alcibiades* 166. Besides, he was probably involved in the process of establishing an Asclepian cult in his home country, Lydia (*Vita Procli* 32). It is against this background that one may look at the Neoplatonic attitude to medicine. Having discussed first the principal philosophical interpretations of Asclepius found in Apuleius, Aelianus, Macrobius, Julian, Porphyry, Iamblichus, Proclus, Damascius, etc., we turn to Proclus’ attitude to Athena and Asclepius as reflected in Marinus’ *Vita Procli* and finally discuss the cult of Eshmun as found in Damascius. The textual data are supported by archaeological evidence from the “House of Proclus” in Athens.
Tomáš Nejeschleba (organizer)

**NEOPLATONISM IN CENTRAL EUROPE BETWEEN THE 15th AND 17th CENTURY**

Martin Žemla:
*Influentia, lumine et motu Solis irradiatus…*
Ficino’s Metaphysics of Light in the Work of Heinrich Khunrath

*Centre for Renaissance Texts, Palacky University, Olomouc (Czech Republic)*

German physician, Paracelsian, alchemist, theosopher and Lutheran Heinrich Khunrath (1560–1605) counts among the authors who, for some time, at least, gathered around Rudolf II in Prague. He became one of the *medici ordinarii* to the count Vilém of Rožmberk (Rosenberg) in 1591, sharing this position, for example, with the Czech physician and astronomer Tadeáš Hájek (Hagecius). Khunrath published here one of his works in 1592, just to leave shortly afterwards for Germany. His major work, the *Amphithetarum sapientiae aeternae* (1595, expanded 2nd ed. 1609) is, basically, a multifaceted, magnificently illustrated commentary on the Biblical Book of Wisdom and Book of Proverbs; it is *christiano-cabalisticum, divino-magicum, et physico-chymicum*, demanding unity of all these aspects (*tertriunum, catholicon*) and parallel “reading” of the “three divine books”, the Bible, nature, and man. Here, as well as in others of his works, he presents himself as an author with humanistic training, wide scale of knowledge and sincere piety. Though he does not mention Marsilio Ficino among the “most learned man”, it is unlikely that he should be ignorant of the great Florentine platonist’s ideas. Indeed, especially Ficino’s metaphysics of light, in many of its aspects, seems important to Khunrath for whom fire, light and sun have divine attributes and who accepts the Ficinian–Paracelsian epistemology of “two divine lights”.

Jiří Michalík:
*Johannes Kepler and His Neoplatonic Sources*

*Centre for Renaissance Texts, Palacky University, Olomouc (Czech Republic)*

The main goal of my paper is to consider the Neoplatonic influence on Johannes Kepler. Kepler was a close follower of Neoplatonic ontology as well as he acknowledged the importance of the Neoplatonic scientific lore in many substantial respects. Kepler’s main Neoplatonic philosophical authority was Proclus. Therefore, I try to summarize Kepler’s positive evaluation of Proclus’ understanding of the relationship between science and theology. Kepler’s opposition to Neoplatonic theurgy, especially to Iamblichus’ and Porphyry’s theurgy, is also taken into consideration. Finally, I argue that the influence of the classical Neoplatonic philosophy on Kepler was so great, that he started to interpret many of Plato’s ideas through its conceptual framework.

Tomáš Nejeschleba:
*The Platonic Framework of Valeriano Magni’s Philosophy*

*Palacky University Olomouc (Czech Republic)*

The Capuchin monk Valeriano Magni (1586–1661) built up his thought as an alternative to Aristotelianism and the Second
Scholasticism of Jesuits in particular. Influenced by the natural philosophy of William Gilbert and Galileo Galilei, he aimed to create a new, Christian philosophical system which would be in concord with both new sciences and the metaphysics of the medieval Platonic tradition. Although in the realm of natural philosophy Magni adopts atomistic theory, crucial moments in his philosophy are Platonic and are derived from ancient, medieval, and renaissance Platonism. The aim of this paper is to analyze these points and to show the importance of Magnis’s doctrines, including: the distinction between the realm of the existing world and the realm of ideas; the theory of participation; the ontological superiority of the soul; the conception of the soul as the image of God; the metaphysics of light; and the ontological, epistemological, and physical meaning of light. All these features indicate that Valeriano Magni was a real follower of Plato, whom he considered as uniquely inspired by God among all the philosophers of ancient times.

Luka Boršić and Ivana Skuhala Karasman: Adventures of a Christian Cabalist
Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb (Croatia)

Paulus Scalichius (Pavo Skalić) was born in Zagreb in 1534 (?) and died in Gdansk in 1575. In 1553, he received the title of doctor theologiae defending 1553 different theses. Contemporary sources testify about Skalichius talent and capacity to learn. It is impossible to squeeze his adventurous life into a short summary; he was truly a scholar-vagabond. The list of places where he lived is impressive, especially in regard to his relatively short life (41 years): Zagreb, Ljubljana, Vienna, Bologna, Rome, Vienna, Wiener Neustadt, Graz, Stuttgart, Regensburg, Tübingen, Strassburg, Ulm, Pfalz, Basel, Zürich, Heidelberg, Speyer, Basel, Kühndorf, Königsberg, Vilnius, Thorn, Leslau, Posen, Berlin, Wittenberg, Weimer, Erfurt, Gotha, Frankfurt, Mainz, Nancy, Paris, Köln, Münster, Gdansk. Having in mind how much time and energy he spent on defending his false nobility and trying to gain a high position in society, it is even more impressive that he had time to write books on philosophy and theology. His philosophical approach is fundamentally a neoplatonic concordism: by compiling different philosophical positions his main project was to compose a compendium of all philosophical and theological doctrines in order to show that all their doctrines are fundamentally in agreement as a part of the tradition of “aeterna sapientia”, starting from the legendary Hermes Trismegistus—the concept he adopted from A. Steuco.

Paulus Scalichius wrote on Christian Cabala in his work *Encyclopaediae seu orbis disciplinarum, tam sacrarum, quam prophanarum* Epistemon, where he calls it symbolic philosophy. The founder of what was later to be known under the name of Christian Cabala was Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, who wrote *Conclusiones Cabalistae numero LXXI* (Rome, 1486). Scalichius’s Epistemon was first published in Basel in 1559, in a Protestant version, and then again in Cologne in 1571, in its Catholic version. In Scalichius’s understanding of Cabala he was influenced by Johannes Reuchlin and his work De arte Cabalistica. In our talk we will expound on the understanding of Christian Cabala as found in the Scalichius work Epistemon.
José C. Baracat Jr.
and Suzanne Stern-Gillet (organizers)

TIME AND SPACE IN NEOPLATONISM

Irini F. Viltanioti:
Time and Eternity in Porphyry of Tyre
KU Leuven (Netherlands),
University of Oxford (United Kingdom)

In *Timaeus* 37 d 8–9, Plato defines time as “an eternal image, moving according to number, of Eternity, which abides in unity” (αἰῶνος ἐν ἑνὶ κατʼ ἀριθμὸν ἰοῦσαν αἰώνιον εἰκόνα, τοῦτον ὃν δὴ χρόνον ὠνομάκαμεν). In his now lost *Commentary on the Timaeus*, Porphyry commented upon this passage. However, the surviving concise testimony from Proclus’ *Commentary on the Timaeus* (Fr. 78, p. 66, 7–67, 2 Sodano) does not reveal much on Porphyry’s understanding of Plato’s definition of time: it only briefly focuses on the meaning of “image” (εἰκὼν) as referring to the participation (μετεῖχε) of the sensible in the intelligible within this context. In this paper, I argue that *Sententia* 44 can shed light on some key-aspects of Porphyry’s understanding of Plato’s treatment of time in *Timaeus* 37 d 8–9. I propose a new interpretation of *Sententia* 44, p. 59, 1–12 Lamberz, which I read in association with Fr. 223, p. 246,1–247,20 Smith (= Cyril. *Contra Iul. I* 32 c-d, 552 B1–C8) deriving from Book IV of Porphyry’s fragmentary *History of Philosophy* (Φιλόσοφος Ἱστορία). My conclusion will be that, following the lead of Plotinus, Porphyry builds on Plato’s text in an innovative way by elaborating a new definition of Eternity as

χρόνος τῶν ἐν χρόνῳ. This approach, which is—I submit—consistent with Porphyry’s “telescopic” as it were view of the hypostases, amounts to a hierarchy of three different kinds of time, each of which corresponds successively to Intellect, Soul, and the sensible realm.

Lenka Karfíková:
Eternity and Time in Porphyry’s Sentence 44
*Charles University, Prague (Czech Republic)*


Eine sinnliche Abbildung dieser zirkulierenden Aufmerksamkeit ist für Porphyrius die Sternenbewegung, die mit der Zirkulation der Aufmerksamkeit zugleich eine Erstreckung im Raum verbunden. Damit ist die Zeit in mehrfache „Zeiten“ der einzelnen Sternenkreisläufe verteilt, die je auf ihre eigene Weise die Zeit der Seele nachbilden.

die Parallelen dieser Zeitauffassung bei den christlichen Autoren erwähnt (v.a. Marius Victorinus).

Marc-Antoine Gavray:
Philoponus and Simplicius on the Eternity of Time
*University of Liège (France)*

At the very end of Antiquity, two Neoplatonist philosophers, Philoponus and Simplicius, argue around their interpretation of Aristotle, while sharing a same background: Plato. Regarding the world, which the *Timaeus* considers as a production from the demiurge, the first one defends the creationist (and Christian) position, the second the eternal (and pagan) thesis. The debate concerns the question of its generation, i.e. not only whether the *cosmos* is generated, but especially the meaning to be given to this term “generation”. It is also a matter of assessing how the generation of the world is in agreement with its power: a generated world can subsist eternally if its power, *qua* created being, can only be limited. The question of the origin of the world, then, leads to that of its persistence and eventual destruction. The issue of time follows directly from that of the creation (or the eternity) of the world. In his *Against Aristotle On the eternity of the World*, Philoponus attacks this latter’s triple argument in favour of the eternity of time, which arouses the reaction of Simplicius. In this paper, I will examine aspects of the polemic between Philoponus and Simplicius regarding the issue of time, by referring them to the framework of their general theory of temporality, respectively.

Anna Izdebska:
A New addition to the Late Antique Neoplatonist Corpus? The Arabic Commentary on the Pythagorean Golden Verses Attributed to Proclus
*University of Warsaw (Poland)*

Both of the extant Arabic commentaries on the Pythagorean *Golden Verses* claim Greek ancestry. However, only one of them, the commentary attributed to Proclus, seems to be a genuine translation of a Greek original. Translated by a Syriac bishop in the 11th c. AD, this otherwise unknown Greek treatise bears the title *The Essentials of the Treatise of Pythagoras known as the Golden. Proclus’ commentary*. Among the modern scholars, there is a rare consensus on its origin: a number of arabists agree that this commentary can be traced back to a late antique Greek text. However, there is an ongoing debate whether this was Proclus Diadochus himself, or a much less known Neoplatonic philosopher Proclus of Laodikeia. Moreover, despite the fact that this commentary should become an important new addition to the late antique...
Neoplatonist corpus, there has been very little research on its actual philosophical contents, which turn out to be fascinating.

This text is indeed unique in the Arabic Pythagorean tradition: a rare case of a direct, faithful translation of a Greek philosophical work—so different from the numerous summaries and collections of extracts produced by Arabic authors on the basis of the Greek heritage. Therefore, in my paper I want to approach this text as a late antique Neoplatonic philosophical work, with the aim of reconstructing the author’s philosophical agenda and his worldview.

There can be no doubt that this Greek author belonged to one of the late antique Neoplatonic schools and that he was a pagan. Thanks to the fact that the late antique pagan Neoplatonism was not a monolith, we can try to identify the actual author with more precision. Thus, in my talk I will try to show that there are grounds to attribute this text to Proclus Diadochus; this becomes clear once this text is examined against the background of the surviving Greek texts from the Proclean corpus. Based on this attribution, I will examine this commentary as a new source for our knowledge about this prolific Neoplatonic philosopher.

The text contains a lot of elements characteristic for Proclus, in particular a specific mix of philosophical monotheism with religious polytheism, including some elements of traditional pagan religiosity. It presents familiar aspects of Proclus’ metaphysics and cosmology, his doctrine of the soul and his distinctive theory of Providence. It is also worth comparing the image of Pythagoras and his philosophy presented in the commentary with what Proclus wrote about this subject in his surviving Greek works. Pieces of information about Pythagoras and Pythagoreanism included in this commentary turn out to be an important addition to the extant Greek biographies of Pythagoras and they broaden our understanding of how the late antique Neoplatonists perceived and assimilated the figure of this archaic Greek philosopher.

Thus, this Arabic text has the potential to significantly expand our knowledge of the late antique Neoplatonism and its connection to Pythagoreanism. These are exactly the kind of fruits that classicists hope the medieval Arabic philosophical corpus will bear. However, what actually makes this commentary so important, is exactly the fact that these fruits are actually such a rare delight.

Daniel Regnier:
Argument and Ascent in Islamic Neoplatonism: The Theology of Aristotle as Spiritual Exercise
St. Thomas More College (Canada)

The range of genres and positions in medieval Islamic philosophy may seem paradoxical: rigorous argumentation displaying a full appreciation of the power of logic contrasts with mystical texts rejecting many of the claims of reason. While, in some sense, the systematic “scholastic” text is in fact an invention of Islamic philosophers, on the other hand, the poetry of a Sufi thinker such as Rumi also arguably represents an enormous contribution to philosophy. It would be far too simplistic to reduce the diversity of textual genres and argumentative approaches in Islamic philosophy to a mixed reception of both Platonic and Aristotelian perspectives, construed as opposing poles, and bestowing on Islamic thinkers a tension inherent in Greek thought. On the contrary, as it has been noted often enough, the Islamic reception of Greek philosophy was precisely a reception of the “Alexandrian Synthesis”, that is, a view that saw Plato and Aristotle as essentially in agreement. Nevertheless, since Islamic philosophers seem to have had rather little direct access to authentic texts of Plato and were, consequently, more or less unaware of the problems of interpreting Platonic dialogues, they do often seem to model their work more on expository, didactic and argumentative texts of Aristotle and some of the Aristotelian commentators. Medieval Islamic philosophers comment relatively rarely on the structure of the source texts. This has, I suggest, made it easy for those who study the Arabic Plotinus, and in particular the Theology of Aristotle as a source for philosophers of the Islamic world to overlook important aspects of the texts qua texts. Indeed, scholars have tended to look at the Theology of Aristotle simply as a compendium of doctrines which figure in the
works of Islamic thinkers; in other words, doctrines elaborated in the *Theology of Aristotle* tend to be discussed with little reference to their context in the text. However, the *Theology of Aristotle* does not read like a compendium of metaphysical doctrines. Not only is the text largely concerned with psychological questions, it is also characterized by a clear structure and trajectory, as well as a general exhortatory character. The textual form of the *Theology of Aristotle* is carefully crafted. In fact, close consideration of the textual nature of the *Theology of Aristotle* allows us to understand it as a spiritual exercise in the sense developed by Pierre Hadot. An understanding that Greek philosophy was transmitted to philosophers of the Islamic world in such a form is significant insofar as it allows us to better understand the real nature of the textual sources which nourished philosophy in the Islamic world.

The so-called *Theology of Aristotle*, which is in fact the most important part of the Arabic Plotinus and the principal source for Neoplatonism in the medieval Islamic World, has often been read as a compendium of metaphysical doctrines. Very little attention has been paid to its textual form. I argue that the textual form of the *Theology of Aristotle* is carefully crafted such as to function as a spiritual exercise in the sense developed by Pierre Hadot.

Michael Engel:
The Impact of Averroes’ Paraphrase of the “Republic” on Medieval Jewish Philosophy
*Universität Hamburg (Germany)*

Averroes’ paraphrase of Plato’s *Republic* was translated from Arabic into Hebrew by Samuel of Marseille in the 14th century. As the Arabic source was lost, the Hebrew translation became the only surviving evidence of the text, for medieval authors and for modern scholars alike. A key figure in the preservation and dissemination of the text was R. Elijah Del Medigo, the 15th century Jewish philosopher/translator from Padua, who incorporated sections from the *Paraphrase* in his own works and translated it from Hebrew into Latin at the request of count Pico della Mirandola. In my talk I will examine the complex textual history of the *Paraphrase* (Arabic-Hebrew-Latin), its impact on the thought of Elijah Del Medigo, and its place within the wider context of medieval Jewish reception of Plato’s political thought.

Yehuda Halper:
Platonic Eros and Biblical Love: Plato’s “Symposium” in Johanan Alemanno’s Interpretation of “Song of Songs”
*Bar Ilan University (State of Israel)*

When Pico della Mirandola turned to Johanan Alemanno for help understanding the Song of Songs and Levi Gersonides’ Hebrew commentary on it, Alemanno informed him that he had been working on his own commentary on the work for some years. Alemanno’s commentary, *Hesheq Shelomo* (“Solomon’s Eros”), which he completed with Pico’s encouragement, sought to provide a Jewish alternative to the primarily Christian renaissance neo-Platonism. Like other works of renaissance neo-Platonism, *Hesheq Shelomo* is an eclectic assortment not only of Platonic notions, but of magic, medicine, astrology, Aristotelian science, religious ritual, and Kabbalah. In fact, scholars have been interested in the work primarily for its mystical content and even its approach to practical magic. Yet, like Pico, Marsilio Ficino, and other renaissance neo-Platonists, Alemanno saw himself as a philosopher and understood what we take to be non-philosophic interests as part of his Platonic approach. Accordingly, if he is to be understood on his own terms, he must be read as a reader of Plato and Platonic works. Alemanno’s chief interest in his works, especially in *Hesheq Shelomo*, is love and eros, particularly of God. His accounts of love and eros build explicitly on Platonic works, which he must have accessed through newly available translations into Latin. Indeed, he even explains many Arabic works which he read in Hebrew translation as derived from Plato, e.g., Batalyawsi’s *Imaginary Circles* and Ibn Ṭufayl’s *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzan*. In fact, Plato’s *Symposium* provided Alemanno with the central locus for accounts of Eros.
which he then read into the Song of Songs. All other accounts of love and eros in Hesheq Shelomo are derived from Aristophanes’ speech, Socrates’ speech, and to some extent Alcibiades’ comments as presented in the Symposium. In this paper, we shall examine Alemanno’s explicit references to the Symposium in Hesheq Shelomo and how these references frame and define his account of ideal Jewish love of God.

Simon J.G. Burton:
Cusanus and the Universal Reformation: The Legacy of Fifteenth-Century Lullist and Neo-Platonic Reform“
University of Warsaw (Poland)

In recent years, prompted by the scholarship of Joseph Freedman, Howard Hotson, Vladimir Urbanek and others, there has been a resurgence of interest in the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century “universal reformation”. Going beyond what they saw as the partial and incomplete reforms of previous centuries, including the Reformation itself, universal reformers such as Bartholomäus Keckermann, Johann Heinrich Alsted and Jan Amos Comenius all sought a comprehensive and complete reform of contemporary philosophy, politics and religion, and indeed of every human discipline and activity. In particular, the universal reformers hoped to remodel Church and society on the basis of a universal idea, or pattern, grounded in the divine mind and accessible to humanity through a variety of channels. Fundamental to universal reform therefore was a transformation of method according to a dynamic convergence of epistemology, ontology and theology.
While the roots of the universal reformation in the Ram- 
ist, Lullist and encyclopaedic movements of Central Europe are 
now well attested, the late medieval antecedents of this movement 
are in many ways only just beginning to be discovered. In this 
paper, following a path already mapped out in outline by Charles 
Lohr, Thomas Leinkauf and the great Czech scholar Jan Patočka, 
I will examine the deep roots of universal reformation in fifteenth-
century Lullist and Neo-Platonic reform, and in particular in the 
thought of the celebrated German polymath Cardinal Nicholas of 
Cusa. For while anticipated by important figures such as Ramon 
de Sébonde and Heimeric de Campo, the latter of whom was a 
close friend and mentor, it is undoubtedly in Cusanus’ works that 
we may see the true transcending of scholastic method, coupled 
with one of the most far-reaching programmes of reform of the 
fifteenth century, not to mention the entire period of early moder-
nity.

Mapping out the contours of Cusanus’ universal reform, 
as well as its subsequent legacy, is a complex task that goes well 
beyond a single paper. Naturally, his own metaphysical break-
through to the coincidence of opposites in his De Docta Ignorantia 
must play a central role in this story. However, even among the 
later universal reformers this seems to be something of a minority 
report, at least in its explicit formation—with Comenius the most 
obscure exception. In some respects the fortunes of his 
grand visions of ecclesial and societal reform in the De Concordan-
tia Catholica and De Pace Fidei are easier to trace, for they clearly 
register in the Fabrist Circle, the works of Guillaume Postel and 
above all in the massive Consultatio Catholica of Comenius. Like-
wise, Cusanus’ mathematical theology, anticipates aspects not only 
of the seventeenth-century quest for mathesis universalis but even, 
as a number of scholars have argued, of Leibniz’s method of the

In this paper, however, I will focus on a different trajec-
tory, although ultimately one of no less significance—Cusanus’ 
Trinitarian and exemplaristic reform of language, method and 
logic. In a number of his works, but especially his late Compendium 
and De Aequalitate, Cusanus argues for an important transforma-
tion of the linguistic arts of the trivium and endeavours to put this

Petr Pavlas:
Triadism and the Book Metaphor in 
John Amos Comenius
Institute of Philosophy, Academy of Science 
of the Czech Republic

This paper will concentrate on two topics. The first topic 
is triadism, the conscious intention of trichotomizing and looking 
for threeness in every aspect of reality. Although triadism is present 
also in Aristotle, it is especially characteristic of both non-Christian 
Neoplatonists like Porphyrios or Proclo, and Christian Neopla-
tonists like Augustine or Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite. The 
second topic investigated is the well-known metaphor of the “book 
of nature” which was made famous by Augustine, although first 
ascribed to Anthony the Great by Evagrius Ponticus and Socrates 
Scholasticus. Triadism and the metaphor of the “book of nature” 
are remarkably unified by the Czech philosopher and “teacher 
of nations” John Amos Comenius (1592–1670). He speaks about 
a trifold book of God: the book of nature, the book of the mind
Jan Čížek:
The Pansophia of John Amos Comenius in the Context of Renaissance Neo-Platonism

University of Ostrava (Czech Republic),
Centre for Renaissance Texts, Palacky University,
Olomouc (Czech Republic)

John Amos Comenius was certainly influenced by existing Neo-Platonic conceptions, in particular, the teachings of Tommaso Campanella. In the 1640s, Comenius significantly improved upon the Campanellian theory of successive worlds by revising his original linear ascendent model (which can be found in his earlier pansophic treatises Pansophiae praeludium and Conatuum pansophicorum dilucidatio) and replacing it with a cyclical model. The new model was built around the Mundus artificialis, a very original philosophical concept that refers to the world as made by autonomous man, which serves to bring the universe to completion and to its last end, God. This modification of the traditional Neo-Platonic schema, together with Comenius’s recognition of the freedom and agency of man as co-creator of the world, has been recognised as an important contribution to philosophy.

Several historians of philosophy have also aptly pointed out that there had been no such concept in philosophy before Comenius and that Comenius, therefore, occupies a special place in the Neo-Platonic tradition. In the Neo-Platonic schema, new worlds are created by moving away from the original unity, through increasing disharmony; in Comenius’s conception, the activity of man gives rise to a new reality and a new harmony. The aim of this paper will be to analyse Comenius’s relation to renaissance Neo-Platonism and also to compare Comenius’s views with his most important predecessor in this regard—Tommaso Campanella.

Marilena Vlad:
The Self-Constituted Being. Proclus and Damascius

Institute for Philosophy “Al. Dragomir”, Bucharest (Romania)

My analysis is an attempt to show how Damascius understands the problem of a self-constituted reality. I start with a brief survey of this problem in Proclus’ thinking (as it appears from the Elements of Theology and from the Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides), and then I shift to Damascius, in order to see how he continues this theme. Focusing on his treatises On the First Principles, In Parmenidem and In Philebum, I will try to show that, though Damascius borrows this topic from Proclus, he reveals some inner difficulties and aporiai of self-constitution.

On the one hand, self-constitution is applied to the unified and is described by Damascius as “substantiation according to its manence in the One” (R. 156.20). The self-constituted is thus prior to the self-vital and to the self-knowledge. Moreover, it doesn’t
even seem to leave its identity with the One and distinguish itself. On the other hand, however, self-constitution is described as a process through which the unified being (also called the mixt) produces itself unitarily (De principiis, R 36.35), and yet, in so doing, it also distinguishes its own elements in itself. In other words, self-constitution implies a challenging paradox: the self-constituted is also self-disassembling itself, establishing itself as an entity made up of other elements and manifesting its proper plurality. Still, Damascius also insists that, if the unitary being appears to us as plural, it is because we are dividing ourselves in regard to its unique simplicity. In this respect, I will try to show that this paradoxical self-constitution reveals some particular traits of our thinking and of the manner in which the intellectual activity is accomplished.

Chiara Militello:
Is Self-Knowledge One or Multiple?
Consciousness in “Simplicius”,
Commentary on On the Soul
Catania University (Italy)

The statements about self-knowledge that can be found in the commentary on On the Soul traditionally attributed to Simplicius are certainly very interesting. While every other Neoplatonic philosopher identifies a single faculty as the seat of self-knowledge, the commentator on On the Soul describes three kinds of consciousness, each of them linked to a different part of the soul (sensitive soul, rational soul, intellect) but all of them based on the same mechanism of self-reversion. This complex theory can be seen by two different points of view. On one hand, one can stress the differences between the three kinds of self-consciousness, showing how the theses of this Neoplatonic commentator foreshadow the modern psychological concept of “multiple self-aspects”. On the other hand, it is possible to highlight self-reversion as a feature that all the parts of soul that are able to know their own activities share; indeed, the concept

of self-reversion is very important in “Simplicius” for other reasons as well, e.g. to explain rational assent, as Ursula Coope (Rational Assent and Self–Reversion) has recently shown. Each of the two mentioned approaches has been championed by one of the two books that have been written about self-knowledge in the commentary on On the Soul in the last ten years: while my monograph about La dottrina dell’autocoscienza nel commentario al De anima attribuito a Simplicio (2013) focuses on the distinction between sense, reason and intellect as self-conscious, the angle Matthias Perkams chose in Selbstbewusstsein in der Spätantike (2008) was to describe the different species of self-knowledge through the single concept of self-reversion. The aim of this paper is to discuss the relative merits of these two interpretations, whose implications stretch beyond the mere concept of self-knowledge. First of all, the problem whether it is more correct to talk about one or three forms of consciousness in “Simplicius” is related to the more general question of the unity of the soul: is ψυχή one or multiple? Furthermore, if you focus on a single common mechanics of consciousness, you are more likely to frame the commentator’s theory as either Platonic or Aristotelian, rather than discriminating the sources of the different kinds of self-knowledge. It is not by chance that Perkams thinks that the commentator’s theory is fundamentally Aristotelian, while I have called attention to the difference between the way “Simplicius” interprets in a personal but faithful way Aristotle’s synaisthêsis and the Platonic roots of his theses about reason and intellect knowing themselves. Finally, the way you look at the commentator’s take on self-knowledge inevitably affects your position in the famous debate about his identity. Since in his Answers to Khosroes Priscian states that self-knowledge always implies self-reversion, a scholar who thinks that epitrophe pro hauton is a key concept in the commentary on On the Soul will have a strong reason to think that the commentary was written by Priscian. Conversely, my theory about the multiple kinds of self-knowledge in the commentary has prevented me from accepting Priscian as the certain or very likely author of the commentary (since I am not sure that the commentary was written by Simplicius either, I call the author “Simplicius” in quotation marks). I will try to show how all these
different facets of this complex commentary can be shown by looking at it through the lens of the two different, complementary interpretations of the commentator’s theory of self-knowledge.

François Lortie:
Philosophy and Philology in Proclus’ interpretation of Plato
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In the Neoplatonic tradition, notably in Proclus’ works, the interpretation of one of Plato’s dialogues is governed by its aim (skopos), or design (prothesis), as defined by its interpreter. In his Commentary on the Timaeus, Proclus states that the science of Nature is the skopos of the dialogue. Therefore, it must be read as a whole and in each of its parts according to this interpretative design (In Timaeum, I, 1, 5 sqq.). Although this general view of the dialogue seems common (Nature being its core subject, as shown by the importance Timaeus’ speech on the creation of the natural World), the inventiveness and speculative complexity of Proclus’ exegesis is surprising for Modern scholars, as it was also controversial for some Ancient thinkers. His commentary wants to set out the Platonic science (physics and its theological principles) as a true philosopher should conceive it, that is, in Proclus’ case, according to the speculative system inherited from his master, Syrianus. In his discussion of the physical and theological doctrines often only implicit in the Timeaus, Proclus discards what he calls a philological approach to the text for the benefit of his philosophical aim, that is, the search for truth. Indeed, he criticises a more literal, not to say more historically faithful, interpretation of the dialogue, practised by the likes of Longin, who reads this text as a philologist (In Tim., I, 14, 7 sqq.). As a philosopher, Proclus’ self-assigned task is rather to expand the science to which Plato gave its starting points (aphormai). While presenting the philologists’ interpretations in the doxographic sections of his commentary, Proclus reminds his reader that one must remember that this dialogue is Pythagorean and write his exegesis in a manner agreeing with them (In Tim., I, 15, 23–25), namely the Pythagoreans. This interpretative decision will determine his whole exegesis of the Timaeus, notably his solutions to textual difficulties found in the dialogue. Proclus still acts as a philosopher, in this case as a Pythagorean-type philosopher, as he performs the tasks of the philologist (as we would nowadays define the scholar who is scrutinizing the writings of the Ancients).

Based on an analysis of Proclus’ statements on the interpretation of Plato, I will examine the relations between the philosophical and philological approaches to the authoritative texts. I will use the prologue of the Platonic Theology to comment on the reasons of Proclus’ choice for an exegesis fitting for the lovers of the contemplation of truth (Theol. Plat., I, 9, 35, 1–2). I will show how the oppositions between the logical and theological readings of the Parmenides and the philological and philosophical interpretations of the Timaeus are a manifestation of Proclus’ speculative approach to Plato’s dialogues. By commenting on a selection of key passages and concepts, I will work on defining the framework of Proclus’ theory of interpretation, notably by analysing the notion of starting-points (aphormai), which are the principles of the science of Being found explicitly or implicitly in Plato’s writings.
PLATO AND PLOTINUS

Menahem Luz:
The Image of Socrates in Antisthenes’ Lost Dialogues
University of Haifa (State of Israel)

Socrates’ character is often identified with the image dramatized in the dialogues of Plato and Xenophon. We also catch a glimpse of him in the fragments of Antisthenes’ lost dialogues. The latter wished to convey his friend’s inner strength (*to karterikon*; 12A) and wealth of spirit (Fr. 82) rather than the argumentative and *aporetic* figure domineering Plato’s “Socratic” dialogues. An important element of Antisthenes’ argumentation was the use of moral instruction in the form of a character’s set-speech terminating with the proper account of moral concepts. He thus differed from Plato’s presentation of an *aporetic* and refutative Socrates critical of sophist rhetoric. Antisthenes’ presentation comprised brief sketches of separate episodes in the lives of the characters in contrast to the unity and flow of Plato’s compositions. His arguments were not set as direct *elenchic* refutations of a contradiction which for Antisthenes should be avoided, but as an assertion of moral principles that were the teaching of the dialogue. Judging from argumentation, we would have portrayed his mentor as interested in the correct definition of ethical values, but not in the invention of intricate refutations. A state *aporia* would be the result of detailed discussion of the qualities of virtue in contrast to the search for its primary meaning. His portrayal of Socrates would have lacked the metaphysical and ontological interests discussed in the Platonic dialogues. We should not conclude that his portrayal of Socrates is identical with that of the historical Socrates. As other Socratics, Antisthenes was interested in conveying his own philosophy in the name of his mentor rather than through the latter’s image.

Miriam Byrd:
Plato’s Forms in Us as Objects of Dianoia
University of Texas at Arlington (USA)

In Book 6 of Plato’s *Republic*, Socrates uses the image of the Divided Line to distinguish four mental conditions, two associated with the visible realm and two with the intelligible. He differentiates the subsections of the visible segment of the line, *eikasia* and *pistis*, by the objects grasped by the soul in each. However, when he marks the distinction between *dianoia* and *noêsis*, the conditions associated with the intelligible segment, he contrasts them based upon their methods of inquiry. Socrates tells us that dialectic, the epistemological method of *noêsis*, directly grasps the Forms, but he makes no mention of a unique class of objects associated with dianoetic reasoning, a methodology he associates with mathematics. Consequently, there has been a history of controversy within Plato scholarship over the identity of the objects of dianoia, particularly the objects of mathematics, with disagreement as to whether Plato intended them to be Forms, intermediates, or sensible things used as images of the Forms.

In this paper, I will outline the debate, explain the main drawbacks to each approach, and conclude that the matter is left unresolved. In the course of examining objections against these positions, I will note challenges a successful interpretation must face. First, the Line and its accompanying image, the Cave, require us to find objects at the level of dianoia that image those at noêsis in a way similar to that in which the objects of *eikasia* image those of *pistis*. Second, since mathematics makes reference to several instances of each number and geometrical object, a successful interpretation must identity objects that can be repeated in this manner. Finally, it is preferable to invoke only entities explicitly discussed by Plato in the dialogues.
In answer to these challenges, I posit a revised version of the interpretation put forth by Nicholas D. Smith. Following Smith, I argue that “sensible things used as images of the Forms’ are the objects used in dianoetic reasoning. Unlike Smith, I contend that they are also the objects of dianoetic thought, identifying the objects of dianoia with the “forms in us” of the Phaedo or the “moving” forms in Republic 402c. Drawing from Socrates’ description of his mathematical curriculum in Book 7, I will argue in support of my interpretation by demonstrating that the summoning process discussed in 522e–523c of Republic 7, associated by Socrates with the subjects that turn the soul from becoming toward being, is an integral part of dianoetic reasoning underlying the mathematical disciplines. I argue that the objects of thought are abstractions emerging from the summoning process.

In conclusion, I show how my version of the interpretation meets the three challenges mentioned above.

Sara Ahbel-Rappe:
Socrates’ Esoteric Disclosure in Plato’s “Apology”: a Comparative Religions Approach
University of Michigan (USA)

Socrates, son of Chaeredemus, executed in 399 by the Athenian democracy, wrote nothing in his lifetime. He was the consummate public intellectual, someone who denied he ever taught anyone in private, a philosopher so popularized that even in his own day he gave rise to an entire genre, the “Sokratikoi Logoi”, or literary portraits of Socrates. Socrates’ death at the hands of his fellow citizens, his infamous disavowal of knowledge, his ironic dissimulation—all of these are the stuff of such common treatment, that no philosopher would seem a less likely thinker to secret away under the mantel of the Western esoteric tradition. But in terms of the dramatic chronology of the dialogues, the very first time we encounter Socrates is in the Parmenides, which then forms the spiritual bookend to the esoteric pronouncement we find in the Apology. In the Parmenides, we meet the young Socrates at the very beginning of his philosophical life, undergoing initiation into Eleatic philosophy under the tutelage of Parmenides and Zeno.

The lessons young Socrates learns, particularly in the second half of the dialogue, where Parmenides elaborates his training in the dialectics of the one and many, allow Socrates an entryway into the first principle of (what would become) Platonic metaphysics, the One beyond being. The One of the Parmenides’ first hypothesis must be denied all predicates: past and future; place, time, and change; any characteristic or identity, and above all, being itself. Here, in confronting the One that is not we see Socrates introduced to the path of radical negation, the via apophatica.

Plato represents Socrates as undergoing this initiation into the One at the dramatic starting point of his dialogues. When in the Apology we meet Socrates at the age of seventy, he has fully developed and found a way to live in the wake, so to say, of this One; he understands the highest possible wisdom as the realization that he has no wisdom. That initial awakening to the ground
of wisdom is something Socrates has lived with—we are meant to understand this within the dramatic development of the Socratic dialogues. Socrates’ first glimpse, portrayed so vividly in the Parmenides, of the reality that is nowhere, no place, not this, not that, is both the starting point for Socrates’ own journey, and the space within which the entire drama of the dialogues unfolds.

By inserting the philosophical trajectory of Socrates in between these two plateaus or perhaps even nadirs of negativity, Plato reveals that Socratic wisdom is the not quite empty space that somehow contains Platonic knowledge, in other words, whatever else unfolds within the span of the dialogues. That is, if Socratic wisdom is the highest wisdom, then all other forms of knowing, including the metaphysical theories that we understand under the banner of Platonism, are subsumed within it.

Platonists in late antiquity continued to elaborate the Platonic vision of ousia as transcendent, even as they also worked to incorporate and account for the rather different understandings of substance offered by the Aristotelian tradition (as expressed in such concepts as the category of “primary substance”) and other important philosophical developments. For some of these later Platonists, this work of intellectual synthesis was further enriched by their commitment to situating their philosophical understanding with reference to religious traditions unknown to the earlier philosophers, including the Christian faith. I will focus on one of these Christian Platonists of late antiquity, Gregory of Nyssa, and his dialogue On the soul and the resurrection. In this work Gregory offers a striking understanding of creaturely being as nonsubstantial and applies this understanding to Christian anthropological concerns. In particular, I will trace Gregory’s frequent use of the...
contrast between what is “outside” (exo) and what is “proper” or “one’s own” (oikeion) and the meticulous philosophical support he provides for the doctrine (controversial among Christian intellectuals) of the final restoration of all things (apokatastasis).

Valery V. Petroff:
Aristotle’s Approach to the Problem of Corporeal Identity and its Development in the Later Tradition
Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Science (Russian Federation)

In my paper I will discuss the problem of the identity of a changing living body that emerged in the form of the Epicharmus’ paradox and the “growing argument” of the Sophists. I will focus on the same problem as formulated by Aristotle in the De generatione et corruptione, where Aristotle wondered what it was in the growing thing that was preserved and persisted throughout changes. His conclusion was that this must be a certain eidos, described as a kind of power immersed in the matter or an elastic pipe imposing a form on flow passing through it. I am going to observe transformations of this theory along with the examples by which it was illustrated in the writings of Alexander of Aphrodisias and John Philoponus. Besides I will show that such Christian thinkers as Origen knew this teaching through Alexander and used it for their own purposes.

Nadezhda Volkova:
Plotinus and Aristotle on Matter and Evil
Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Science (Russian Federation)

The paper treats the problem of evil in Plotinus. Plotinus describes matter as “evil itself”, “primary evil”, “evil per se” (I, 8), “non-being” (II, 4; II, 5; III, 6), and as source of evil in the soul (I, 8). This creates a problem since matter is derived from the One. Many attempts have been made by scholars to solve this paradox (H. Schwyzer, J. Rist, D. O’Brien). In my paper I suggest that we can solve the puzzle if we make clear that matter and the soul play different roles in the case of evil’s emergence. I propose to distinguish these two aspects: the question of the nature of evil and the question of its instrumental cause, as Plotinus himself did. In Enn. I, 8 philosopher mainly looks for definition of evil and comes to the conclusion that the idea of evil is the lack of being, which coincides with the standard concept of matter in Platonism. In other treatises Plotinus investigates how evil comes into the physical world and why bodily things participate in evil. In the latter case, he defines the individual soul as the cause of evil. There is no contradiction, because we have two types of causality: the main (ontological) and instrumental cause. Matter is the ontological cause and the soul is instrumental. Concerning the question of matter, I refer to the previous philosophical tradition, particularly to Aristotle, and analyze in details his concept of matter as a substrate.
In many instances, it seems clear what sorts of things are “bodies”. It seems safe to say that bodies are extended, or take up space. There are at least many bodies that are three-dimensional, and bodies seem to be solid, or impenetrable. Are these, then, the properties of body-hood: dimensionality and impenetrability? Though many philosophers have defined bodies in terms of these qualities, the studies of ancient natural philosophers show that they are not always foolproof indicators in determining in what corporeality consists. In such cases when body does not consist in extension alone, space has a more complicated role which begs investigation.

In this paper I examine the role of dimensionality in not only defining corporeality but also giving an account of space in the work of several early Greek Neoplatonists. These accounts can be best understood in terms of their dependence on accounts of dimensionality, in particular the ontological status of incorporeal extension and its role in the formation of the material composite. Some accounts also focus on the impenetrability or materiality of body as its essential aspect. In analysing these accounts as well as those of their predecessors, I investigate the role of dimensionality in the hylomorphic world, examining these questions by using a case study in accounts of the nature and propagation of light.

I use light as a case study because it represents well accounts of trans-spatial influence of one spurious body on others, such as astrological influence, the propagation of an image in the mirror, and the transmission of images to the eye. These bodies, which are more difficult to account for, provide us interesting insights in investigating how are these tenuous “almost-bodies” are transmitted through space. While their spatial presence is body-like, some other quality, such as their lack of solid existence or a third dimension, makes it unclear why they obey the laws that regular bodies obey. I illustrate this problem of determining the nature of the relationship between bodies and spatial presence by covering Presocratic, Aristotelian, and Platonic accounts of the propagation of light. Then, I examine several ways this problem of categorizing the tenuous body is solved, and analyze the parts these accounts played in specifying the role of dimensionality in the constitution of bodyhood, as well as the incorporeal extension of space.

In some accounts, dimensionality itself becomes a rational principle of geometrization, but interestingly also adopts the status of hylomorphic form in the sense that it has a critical role in the transition from the incorporeal to the corporeal. Accounts such as this give us insight into the conception of the hylomorphic process—helping us to answer questions such as, “where do physical laws begin?” “what gives bodies corporeality?” and, “what distinguishes space and body?” As I describe in the paper’s conclusions, the status of these concepts in ancient philosophy also has an essential influence on early modern natural philosophy, and forms the background for asking questions about foundational entities and ontological commitment, especially in the status of space as an entity, foundation, or something else altogether, in figures like Kepler, Descartes, Newton, and Émilie Du Châtelet, enabling us to follow this rather elusive thread in the history of science.
Jeremy Byrd:
Standing in the Vestibule: Proclus on Intermediates
Tarrant County College (USA)

In the “Prologue” to A Commentary on the First Book of Euclid’s Elements, Proclus informs us that mathematical objects “stand in the vestibule of the primary forms” (5.2–3), echoing Socrates’ words in the Philebus (64c) to describe their intermediate status between the sensible and the intelligible. In the Metaphysics, Aristotle tells us that Plato also assigned an intermediate status to such objects. For those who accept Aristotle’s testimony, the standard approach takes Plato’s intermediates to be abstract particulars. For Proclus, however, the intermediates are projections within the space of our imagination (phantasia). Intriguingly, as projections, they are spatial reflections of non-spatial forms, so that imagination assists discursive reason (dianoia) by presenting us with visual images of the invisible Forms. Examining the two approaches, I argue that the ontology of intermediates attributed to Plato has a significant disadvantage in comparison to Proclus’ account, insofar as abstract particulars, unlike projections in the imagination, would be distinct entities with no discernible differences. It is unclear whether Plato would agree with this assessment, as there is some reason to think he did not accept the identity of indiscernibles. Contrary to another recent interpretation, however, I contend that Proclus’ account is motivated in part by his commitment to this principle.

Michael Chase:
Damascius and al-Nazzām on the Atomic Leap
CNRS-Centre Jean Pépin (France)

In 1983, Richard Sorabji suggested a comparison between the doctrine of the atomic leap in Damascius and in the early Islamic philosopher ibn al-Nazzām (died 849). Like Damascius’ halmata or leaps, Al-Nazzām’s doctrine of the leap (ṭafra) looks very much like an attempt to solve, or at least elude, Zeno’s paradoxes of motion. If, as al-Nazzām seems to have supposed, there are an infinite number of points in act along a line segment between A and B, then in order to travel from A to B, one will have to traverse an infinite number of points in a finite time. But this is impossible, hence it is impossible to move from A to B, and motion is general is thereby proved to be impossible.

Aristotle had at least two responses to this problem. The first one, set forth in Physics VI 2 and 9 233a21ff.; 239b11–19, was to invoke the infinite divisibility—that is, the continuity—of time and space. If a stretch of distance is infinitely divisible, and so is the time which one has available to traverse it, then one simple establishes a one-to-one correspondence between the parts of space and of time, and affirms that an infinitely divisible stretch of distance can be traversed in an infinitely divisible stretch of time.

In Physics VIII.8, however, Aristotle no longer considers this solution to be adequate. A deeper solution is to say that although a continuum, since it is infinitely divisible, does indeed have an infinite number of halves, these halves exist only potentially, not actually. Each of the infinite points in a line can be rendered actual only when an object in motion stops or changes direction at it, or, alternatively, when someone counts them. In such a case, both the object and motion and the person counting are “using the one point as if it were two”, i.e. as the end of the preceding stretch of distance and the beginning of the following one. Thus, Aristotle’s deeper solution to Zeno’s paradox is that an object in motion can indeed traverse an infinite number of points in a finite time, but only if those points are potential rather than actual.

Al-Nazzām seems to have rejected Aristotle’s solution, thinking instead of the infinite number of points in a stretch of distance or the segment of a line as being in act, and solved the resulting aporia of how an infinite number of points could be traversed in a finite time by his doctrine of the leap (ṭafra): in its trajectory, the object in motion does not traverse all of the infinite points, but only some of them, leaping over the rest.

Finally, discuss Marwan Rashed’s recent objections to Sorabji’s rapprochement of the theories of Damascius and
al-Nazzām. Crucial among these is how al-Nazzām could have known Damascius' works, a question to which I propose a tentative solution.

Ágoston Guba:
Desire and Dispositional Memory in Plotinus

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Plotinus, examining the questions relating to memory in his treatise On the problems concerning the Soul, briefly discusses whether memory is involved in the desire (IV 3 [27] 28). At first sight, the desiring power and memory cannot be separated from each other: when the desiring power is affected by a seen thing that was enjoyed earlier, this requires memory; otherwise it cannot be explained why just a certain thing and not another can move the desiring power. Yet, Plotinus' answer will be different: every power is endowed with sense perception in a different way, and the desiring power possesses in itself the trace of an earlier happened thing not like memory but like disposition and affection (ἔχει ἴχνος τοῦ γενομένου ἐντεθέν οὐχ ὡς μνήμην, ἀλλ' ὡς διάθεσιν καὶ πάθος). First with the help of the careful reading of the IV 3 28, and then by taking into account later chapters of the same treatise (IV 4 [28] 20–21, 28) I am going to reconstruct this theory in its detailed form. Arguing against R.A.H. King, I am going to show what Plotinus has in his mind in this passage is not the
disposition of the soul but that of the body. The effect of the desired object is described as a secondary perception: via the primarily perception (i.e. sense perception) the external object brings about a modification in that part of the living body which is disposed to undergo the specific type of desire. However, as the mere physical modification in the primarily sense is not enough to be considered as sense perception, this bodily modification also cannot be regarded as desire but only a preliminary desire (προεπιθυμίαν, προθυμίαν). We can speak about desire only if the effect reaches a certain degree of importance: as a result, we acquire a representation (φαντασία) of it, and in this way, the effect becomes conscious. Thus, if the desiring power is affected again by the same object, then this process happens by the disposition of the body without mental representation—this theory I will call dispositional memory.

Filip Karfík:
The Soul-Body Relation Upside Down
(Plotinus VI.4–5)
Universität Freiburg (Switzerland)

Unlike in the early Enn. IV.8 [6], in the later Enn. VI.4–5 [22–23] Plotinus emphasises that the so-called “descent” of the soul into the body is to be understood as the body’s “coming to” or even “entering into” the soul (VI.4.12.41; 16.7–13). It must be so because the soul does not depart from the whole of the intelligible of which it remains an integral part. Hence, rather than an outflow from the intelligible descending towards the sensible, there is a striving of the sensible towards the intelligible. The “descent” of the soul is but a metaphor for the participation of the body in soul and life. But how precisely does Plotinus describe the soul-body relation from this upside down perspective?

Lela Alexidze:
Eros as Soul’s “Eye” in Plotinus: What Does It See and not See?
Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University (Georgia)

In this paper I propose to discuss those aspects of Plotinus’ understanding of Plato’s Eros, which are related to Plotinus’ definition of Love as “eye” of a soul. In his commentary on Plato’s Symposium (Ennead III 5 [50], On Love), Plotinus says that Eros is “the eye of a soul”, that means, its activity (energeia), by means of which a soul strives toward its origin, parent and cause—the intellect. The desire of a soul to go back, to ascend and to be close to its principle is caused by soul’s rationality, on the one hand, and by the lack of it on the other. Both of them—the rationality and its incompleteness as well—are characteristics of souls. Therefore, Poros (possession of rationality, the logoi) and Penia (poverty, privation of rationality) play key roles in the “realization” of the interrelationship between soul and intellect. The result/product of the unity of these two principles—Poros and Penia—is Eros—the “eye” and activity of a soul. I think, this aspect of Love (that means, its definition as soul’s “eye” and activity—energeia) is existentially interesting for us even nowadays, because, in Plotinus’ theory, the differences in souls’ abilities of “seeing” are not only at some extent predetermined, but also caused and regulated by our own intellectual abilities during our lives. Therefore, the “eyes” of human souls must be different according to the souls’ abilities of “seeing”, while an ability itself can change according to our own personal intellectual condition.

The aim of this paper is to analyze the possible differences between the “Erotes” of different kinds of souls, such as (a) the divine Soul (“heavenly Aphrodite”), (b) the world-soul, and (c) various human souls. The question we shall try to answer can be formulated as follows: Are the objects of “seeing” different for different kinds of souls, or is the object the same but the results of “seeing” are different? Furthermore, we shall try to analyze, whether there is a difference between the soul’s ability to be close to the intellect, on the one hand, and its love, as soul’s “eye”, and its activity, on the other, or not. I suppose that the more a soul is close
to the intellect, the less it needs to activate the function of its “eye” for “seeing” the Forms, as far as they are already (almost) in its presence. We can draw an analogy with Plotinus’ understanding of memory: the intellect does not need memory, and, we can add, it does not need Eros as an “eye” as well. In a similar way, the divine Soul, which is close to the Intellect and not related to the corporeal world, does not (almost?) need the activation of its memory and, consequently, we can say that its “eye” (though it still needs it!) can be less active than the “eye” of a soul which is more distanced from the intellect. From this point of view, we can also add that in the case of individual souls, the more a soul has achieved the status of a “philosophical” one, the less activity its “eye” requires for contemplation, being already (almost) able to be in the presence of the Forms. However, none of the souls can be completely “blind” (in a positive sense of this word), because all of them require an “eye” as a receptacle for logos which they receive from “outside”, that means, from the intellect (consequently, in cases of all souls Penia as matter and receptacle of logos plays an important though different role in each case), like as no one soul can think in a non-discursive mode.

Dylan M. Burns
and Luciana Gabriela Soares Santoprete (organizers)

PLATONISMS OF THE IMPERIAL AGE: HERMETISM, GNOSTICISM, AND THE CHALDAEAN ORACLES

Jonathan H. Young:
Demons on the Border: The Overlapping Demonologies of Origen and Celsus
University of Iowa (USA)

Recent scholarship has suggested that the boundaries between “pagan” and “Christian” were much more fluid in antiquity than a twenty-first-century observer might assume. Daimones (demons) are prime examples of this fluidity. Heidi Marx-Wolf and Travis Proctor have independently demonstrated that Origen and Porphyry’s daemonologies overlap in significant ways. Marx-Wolf and Proctor’s works expose the need to re-examine other potential areas of “pagan”-Christian overlap. Thus, in this regard, this paper will explore the commonalities between Origen’s daemonology and that of the earlier Platonist Celsus. This paper examines the depiction of daimones in Origen’s Contra Celsum, comparing Origen’s statements to the fragments and paraphrases of Celsus’ work, Alethes Logos, preserved by Origen within the text.
Notwithstanding the fact that Origen has filtered Celsus’ words, this paper argues that Origen agrees with Celsus in most regards about the physiology, character, and activities of daimones within Greco-Roman religion, with the major exception that, for Origen, daimones are entirely evil and should never be worshiped. In exploring the debates about daimones, I propose that this paper may further show the ways in which Origen was a part of the larger, common cultural milieu of late antiquity and contribute to the ongoing discussion of religious interaction in the third century C.E.

Luciana Gabriela Soares Santoprete:
Des trois rois de Platon aux trois dieux d’Hésiode: la polémique antignostique dans le Traité 32, 3 de Plotin
Universität Bonn (Germany)

Plotin affirme dans la première section (chapitre 3, 3–24) de la deuxième partie (chapitres 3, 3–13) du Traité 32 que l’Intellect, du fait de posséder tous les intelligibles et de sa nature à la fois unitaire et multiple, correspond au Dieu universel qui occupe le deuxième rang dans la hiérarchie des réalités. Il explicite également l’ordre dans lequel les réalités proviennent à partir de la Réalité Suprême et montre que nous contemplons ce Dieu Second avant que la Réalité Suprême ne parvienne à nous.

Cet ordre hiérarchique est confirmé par la description du cortège du Grand Roi inspirée du récit du cortège des dieux donné par Platon dans le Phèdre (246 e et ss.). L’existence de trois principes dans la sphère supérieure est renforcée par l’attraction de la dénomination de « Roi de Roi et Roi des Rois » à la Réalité Suprême dans une allusion implicite à la distinction entre les Rois de premier, de second et de troisième rang établi par Platon (Ép. II, 312 e). Le fait que ces trois principes existent, comme Platon l’a exprimé, et sont naturellement reliés est réitéré par l’association de ces trois rois aux trois dieux du mythe d’Hésiode à savoir Ouranos, Kronos et Zeus qui sont respectivement grand-père, père et fils.

Notre objectif sera de montrer que, en recourant à ce mythe réputé de la tradition grecque et en l’associant aux doctrines de Platon, Plotin vise à souligner l’ancienneté et donc la légitimité de sa conception de la hiérarchie des réalités supérieures par opposition à la définition de la structure du monde là-haut véhiculée dans les ‘nouveaux’ mythes des ‘récentes’ doctrines gnostiques.

Christopher Sauder:
Providence and Gnosticism from Ennead 33 (II.9) to Enneads 47–48 (III.2–3)
Collège Universitaire Dominicain, Ottawa (Canada)

Plotinus’ ethical critique of the gnostics in treatise II.9 (33) is directed towards their anti-cosmic stance, which implies for him both blasphemy7 and the abdication of virtue.8 What sort of arguments would these gnostics have brought forth in defense of their negative valuation of the material universe? On the basis of Plotinus’ strategies of refutation here and in the later treatises, we can essentially imagine two different lines of gnostic argument. The first of these would be an insistence on the negative determinism of εἱμαρμένη, which for the gnostics would have operated through the archons. The second would have consisted of rejecting the concept of πρόνοια, on the basis of the overwhelming evidence of the reality of evil in this world. Plotinus’ defense of πρόνοια against the cosmic nihilism of gnostic theodicy is not developed very far in treatise II.9 (33), where he seems content merely to ridicule the anti-cosmic stance of the gnostics, without addressing their arguments. A veritable philosophical defense of providence is deferred until the large manuscript that makes up treatises 47 and 48 (III.2–3). As I hope to demonstrate, Plotinus’ tendency in these treatises is to downplay solutions of Platonic provenance and to go all in on Stoic notions of πρόνοια, according to which the whole of reality consists in a cosmic drama in which the logos is responsible for the development of the plot.

7 Ennead II.9 (33), chapter 16, 1–14.
8 Ennead II.9 (33), chapter 15.
Jana Schultz (organizer)

WOMEN AND THE FEMALE IN NEOPLATONISM

Anna Afonasina:
The Letters of the Pythagorean Women in Context
Novosibirsk State University (Russian Federation)

In the paper, I will speak about the forged letters of the Pythagorean women. I will consider three of them. First two letters, ascribed by unknown author to Myia and Theano, are touching upon the issue of right treatment of children and the approaches to be taken for their upbringing. The third letter, also by “Theano”, discusses a vexed question of infidelity on the part of men: what the righteous woman should do if her husband is found to spend time with hetaera. Textual observation on the style and the content of the letters show that they well fit in the ethical context of the epoch of their probable composition, which is the turn of the millennium. Because the letters are ascribed to the Pythagorean women, it is tempting to consider them for the first place in connection with the Neopythagorean tradition, and only secondary with Platonism and Stoicism. Since, on the other hand, no properly Neopythagorean letter is, to the best of our knowledge, preserved, for the closest conceptual parallels one must turn to such authors as Plutarch and Seneca, and, to some extend, to Clement of Alexandria and Iamblichus. Besides, verbal and conceptual analysis of the letters under consideration reveal certain affinity with the *Ethica Nicomachea*, which is not surprising given overall interest of the Pseudo-Pythagorean authors to Aristotle (take for instance the letters on categories, ascribed to Archytas). Having focused on analysis of the notions of morality (ἀρετή) and wisdom (σοφροσύνη), on present occasion I will try to find the closest textual parallels to the letters, which in its turn may allow us to clarify their place in ancient literature.

Bibliography:


Sandra Dučić Collette:
Duke William IX of Aquitaine, Countess of Dia… and the Reversal of the Platonic Concept of Love
Independent Researcher

The Provençal lyric is sometimes overlooked in academia. Yet evidence suggests that poets, playwrights, philosophers, and other maverick intellectuals found fertile ground here for the
growth of their ideas and the harvesting of their work. The goal of my paper is to revive the distinctive spirit of this sung and danced poetry by exploring it from a variety of perspectives, including art history, classics, philosophy and religion, and by considering its influences, especially that of the Greek platonist tradition.

Why does woman become masculine in troubadour poetry? Why the extravagant praise of Poet’s Lady Milord (cf. Duke William IX of Aquitaine)? In stanza four, the poet calls the woman “Milord” (in Provençal mi dons from Vulgar Latin mis dom’mus). Is this not a concession to the notion developed in Plato’s Symposium that only men were really capable of being friends (companho) with men?

How, through their “Milord Lady”, did Provençal lyrics operate a reversal of the Platonic concept of love? And how is it that only the Lady can turn men to look up to the divine, or that she became inspiring Muse and maker of the Poet? And how did the philosophy of the Academy turn into Court Poetry? Philosopher into Courtier? Do we not, after all, imitate what we love?

Ludovica Radif:
Donne “Fuori Misura” Alessandra Scala e Cassandra Fedele

Palacky University, Olomouc (Czech Republic)

Nel clima neoplatonico fiorentino di rinnovamento culturale e di ripresa di antichi testi greci e latini, abbiamo notizia anche di qualche rappresentazione teatrale con cui si intendeva riproporre sulla scena un testo classico. Un caso molto interessante in proposito è quello che ci viene descritto direttamente da Angelo Poliziano, quando racconta che nel 1493 nella casa del cancelliere neoplatonico Bartolomeo Scala (secondo il Kristeller, autore della famosa Epistola de nobilioribus philosophorum sectis et de corum inter se differentia) la figlia Alessandra e il fratello Giuliano avevano recitato in lingua greca antica la tragedia Elettra.

Dalla sua descrizione è stato possibile riconoscere alcuni passaggi del testo sofocleo, quali la scena del riconoscimento e dell’abbraccio tra i due fratelli. La stessa diciottenne Alessandra, qualche tempo dopo, messa in contatto con la famosa dotta veneziana Cassandra Fedele (1465–1558, donna che intratteneva corrispondenza con re e con papi), si rivolgerà a lei per chiedere un consiglio riguardo alla opportunità per una donna colta di prendere marito. Abbiamo tre lettere di questo scambio di idee sulla condizione economica delle donne e sul ruolo che esse potevano occupare nella società. L’impressione che ricaviamo dal loro modo di esprimersi e da alcuni giudizi che in quell’epoca venivano formulati a proposito di tali donne straordinarie è che la loro figura suscitava ammirazione, ma difficilmente trovava una sua collocazione effettiva nella società. Si vede come i tempi non fossero ancora maturi per comprendere appieno le potenzialità del genio femminile, ma esse già sembrano incarnare alcuni ideali di bellezza, saggezza e armonia di natura che la filosofia stava riproporrendo.

La saggia risposta di Cassandra, quella di seguire ciò che la natura personale le indica, in quanto andare contro le proprie disposizioni vorrebbe dire fare una scelta che non dura nel tempo, si intreccerà e si scontrerà con i vari casi della vita che le due donne (Cassandra moglie del medico Gian Maria Mappelli e Alessandra moglie del neoplatonico Michele Marullo) dovranno poi affrontare.
Friday, June 16
Křižkovského 14
16:30–18:00
Room 2.05

**METAPHYSICS, SCIENCE, RELIGION**

Liliana Carolina Sánchez Castro:
The Soul Harmony Theory: Testimony of an Hermeneutic Device for Reading Presocratic Theories in Late Antiquity
*Universidad de Sao Paulo (Brazil)*

In an article of 1987 included in the fifth volume of Peri-patoi devoted to Simplicius, Henry Blumenthal said:

“[…] other general question which should be raised is why Simplicius—or any other commentator—should wish to consider the views of Aristotle’s predecessors, other than Plato, at all. Let us for the moment assume that it is not merely a matter of scholarly interest, but that the process should contribute to the establishment of the truth” (1987 101).

Blumenthal’s clue is crucial for the comprehension of a very interesting chapter of presocratic philosophy’s transmission. This is so, because it does not seem to be, prima facie, a philosophical reason justifying the commentary to the Aristotelian dialectical process. Given that the commentators were more interested in discussing the Aristotelian theory on the soul, it is hard to explain why they would wish to inquire on Presocratics’ views. Nevertheless, there is a theory that, at least, could explain the commentators’ interest, and that can help us to analyze the hermeneutical interest of them in the Aristotelian dialectical process.

The fourth chapter of the first Book of the De Anima starts with the discussion of an anonymous, but plausible, theory. The tradition has brought to us this theory not only with Aristotle, but also with Plato, both of them criticizing it. Tradition has linked both Plato and Aristotle to this theory in a positive way, notwithstanding: it has been said that the soul harmony theory is the ancient opinion which approaches the most to Aristotle’s own conception of the soul as an εἶδος (Hicks 1907 263); it has been linked too with Plato, in particular with the Timaeus’ account on the soul, which is treated by Aristotle just a chapter before. Both the negative and the positive way of dealing with this theory in Plato and Aristotle have a remarkable outcome: in both cases Plato and Aristotle will be in agreement.

In the following paper I want to explore the role that such an amphibian theory could have played in the configuration of an hermeneutical strategy in order to construct an image of the presocratics, an interpretive tradition, in late Antiquity. By doing so I hope to find some of the elements that could help us to understand to what extent commenting on the dialectical procedure of Aristotle’s treatise could be an important step for the commentators in order to achieve their goals. Besides that, it can also provide us a more unified picture of the importance of the presocratic opinions in the circle of Late Antiquity scholarship.

Monika Recinová:
Reception of Xenophanes’ Philosophical Theology in Plato and Christian Platonists
*Palacký University, Olomouc (Czech Republic)*

Xenophanes of Colophon, a presocratic philosopher of the late 6th century BC, formulated in the context of his moralizing and anti-anthropomorphic critique of Homeric and Hesiodic theology a new rational concept of god. Xenophanes can be considered as a proper founder of the highly influential Greek
rational theology. Xenophanean critique of epic theology, which was replaced by a new rational concept of god of the philosophers, became one of the frequently adopted topics in different Greek philosophical schools. The key personage of this extensive ancient reception of Xenophanean rational theology was Plato. The *locus classicus* of Plato's reception of Xenophanes is situated in the second and the third book of Plato's *Republic* in the context of the discussion between Socrates and Adeimantus about the education of the future rulers of Plato's ideal state. The Homeric myths about gods, which are reckoned as the inappropriate examples for the youth, are criticized by the Xenophanean arguments. In consequence of this critique Homer is exiled from Plato's ideal state and Plato's Socrates determines new principles of rational theology (TYPOI PERI THEOLOGIAS), which are deeply influenced by the Xenophanean notion of god.

Plato's reception of Xenophanean philosophical theology was adopted by many later Platonists. It is of eminent importance for the history of Western thought, that this commonly shared TOPOS of Xenophanean theology was accepted—largely via the Platonic tradition—also by many Hellenistic-Jewish and Christian Platonists. The echoes not only of Xenophanean-Platonic critique of Greek myths, but also of Xenophanean rational theology can be found in Philo of Alexandria and many Christian Platonists of the second century (e.g. Aristides Apologeta, Athenagoras of Athens, Justin Martyr, Theophilus of Antioch, Irenaeus of Lyons, Clemens of Alexandria, etc.). Xenophanean rational theology was considered by many church fathers as that part of Greek pagan philosophy, which the Greek philosophers were supposed to borrow from the Hebrew Scripture. Many Hellenistic-Jewish and Christian Platonists tried to use the Xenophanean notion of god in their own Hellenistic-Jewish and Christian theology. Despite this incorrect presupposition of dependence of Xenophanean theology on Hebrew Bible, the comparative analysis of these two theological concepts shows, that the Xenophanean philosophical notion of god diametrically differs from the Biblical notion of God. Its reception in Hellenistic-Jewish and Christian theology caused many severe theological problems (e.g. the problem of the Biblical anthropomorphism or the problem of the divinity of Christ), which cannot be easily solved. It is affirmatively stated by many modern thinkers, that this Xenophanean notion of god cannot be harmonized with the Biblical thinking without the vast devastation of the Biblical notion of God.

Tomasz Mróz:
Lewis Campbell’s Studies on Plato and their Philosophical Significance
*University of Zielona Góra (Poland)*

L. Campbell (1830–1908), a Scottish classics scholar, an expert on Plato and Greek tragedy, invented a complex philological method to solve the riddle of the chronology of Plato's dialogues. Language statistics appears to be a purely philological investigation and chronological order of Plato’s dialogues appears to be a mere historical question, both, however, resulted in far-reaching philosophical consequences. Campbell's method, thus, its application and results provided instructive chronological guidelines for historians of philosophy to interpret Plato's evolution within the firm framework of the order of the dialogues.

Campbell's method, its results and some philosophical consequences of his studies with respect to Plato will be discussed. Short survey of the arguments of his adherents and opponents will follow. In addition to the central issues, namely the evolutionary interpretation of Plato’s philosophical development, some parts of the correspondence between Campbell and Plato scholars of that time will be presented.
A  Dining hall (lunch venue)  1  Konvikt restaurant: A quality restaurant located at the university art centre
B  Conference tours meeting point  2  Coffee Library: A cosy snack bar and café
C  Wednesday reception venue  3  Green Bar: Vegetarian meals
D  Friday conference dinner venue (Podkova restaurant)  4  Forty’s Pizza: Economy dining option
  5  Bistrá kráva: Coffee and snacks  6  Svatováclavský pivovar: Good mid-priced restaurant and microbrewery
  7  Hanácká restaurace: Specialized in local cuisine
  8  Sushi Miomi: Quality Japanese cuisine
  9  Hotel Flora
 10  Palác
 11  Hotel Trinity
 12  Arigone
 13  Hotel v ráji
 14  Na Hradě
 15  U Jakuba
 16  Na Hradbách
 17  U Anděla
 18  Dormitory Generála Svobody
 19  NH Collection Hotel Congress

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